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:_eply to Attn of: Q-1 February 1998
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
Dear MrGoldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel herewith presents its annual report documenting the Panel's activ-
ities for calendar year 1997. We would appreciate NASA's response to the findings and recommendations
in Section II.
This year was a period of consolidation within NASA. Transition to the Space Flight Operations Contract
(SFOC) initiated near the end of 1996 gained momentum during 1997. Many of the less critical tasks and
processes and a few of the more critical ones formerly done by NASA were transferred to the United Space
Alliance. Thus far, Space Shuttle operations under the SFOC have proceeded smoothly and safely as indi-
cated by the record of flight successes.
The Panel firmly believes that NASA and its contractors are presently maintaining a commitment to
"safety first." We are not quite as comfortable about the future. The competitive situation in the aerospace
marketplace is making the retention of experienced and skilled workers difficult at best. Budget appropri-
ations and their allocations are forcing continued staff reductions that have little relationship to workload.
Together with hiring freezes, these staff shortfalls will inevitably hamstring NASA's ability to monitor ade-
quately the performance of Space Shuttle operations. The Panel will continue to observe closely any safety
implications of these circumstances.
The delay of the launch of the first International Space Station (ISS) element was a prudent management
decision. The schedule was extremely tight and quite probably would have caused workarounds and short-
cuts that could have been extremely detrimental to safety. Although the delay did permit some flexibility,
the schedule is still very success oriented. The Panel will watch preparations for the launch of the ISS with
great interest.
The Panel is grateful to all NASA and contractor personnel for their cooperation and assistance during
the past year.
Very truly yours,
Paul M. Johnstone
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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uring 1997, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) continued its
safety reviews of NASA's human space flight and aeronautics programs.
Efforts were focused on those r as that the Panel believed held the greatest
potential to impact safety. Continuing safe Space Shuttle operations and
progress in the manufacture and testing of primary components for the International
Space Station (ISS) were noteworthy.
The Panel has continued to monitor the safety implications of the transition of Space
Shuttle operations to the United Space Alliance (USA). One area being watched
closely relates to the staffing levels and skill mix in both NASA and USA.
Therefore, a section of this report is devoted to personnel and other related issues
that are a result of this change in NASA's way of doing business for the Space
Shuttle. Attention will continue to be paid to this important topic in subsequent
reports.
Even though the Panel's activities for 1997 were extensive, fewer specific recom-
mendations were formulated than has been the case in recent years. This is indicative
of the current generally good state of safety of NASA programs. The Panel does,
however, have several longer term concerns that have yet to develop to the level of
a specific recommendation. These are covered in the introductory material for each
topic area in Section II.
In another departure from past submissions, this report does not contain individual
findings and recommendations for the aeronautics programs. While the Panel
devoted its usual efforts to examining NASA's aeronautic centers and programs, no
specific recommendations were identified for inclusion in this report. In lieu of rec-
ommendations, a summary of the Panel's observations of NASA's safety efforts in
aeronautics and future Panel areas of emphasis is provided.
With profound sadness the Panel notes the passing of our Chairman, Paul M.
Johnstone, on December 17, 1997, and our Staff Assistant, Ms. Patricia M. Harman,
on October 5, 1997.
Other changes to the Panel composition during the past year were: the resignation of
Mr. Dennis E. Fitch as a Consultant; the appointment of Mr. Roger D. Schaufele as
a Consultant; and the assignment of Ms. Susan M. Smith as Staff Assistant.
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The balance of this report presents "Findings, Recommendations, and Observations"
(Section II), "Information in Support of Findings, Recommendations, and
Observations" (Section III), and Appendices (Section IV) listing Panel membership,
the NASA response to the February 1997 ASAP report, and a chronology of the
Panel's activities during the reporting period.
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and Observations
A. SPACESHUTTLEPROGRAM
In general, the Space Shuttle systems performed well during 1997. There were, how-
ever, some in-flight anomalies and development test failures. Among the more
significant of these were: the fuel cell performance uncertainty on STS-83; the nozzle
throat erosion of the Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) on several flights; the
failure of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Number 0524 during a develop-
ment test of the Block II configuration; and the omission of critical washers on the
ferry flight of Atlantis (OV-104) to Palmdale for its Orbiter Maintenance and Down
Period (OMDP).
The Panel tracked the analysis and resolution of these incidents via indepth fact-
finding with both NASA and contractor installations. It was concluded that the
investigation to determine the cause of each incident was carried out by all parties in
scrupulous and tenacious adherence to the standing procedures established by NASA
and its contractors. When extensive testing was conducted to establish and verify
cause(s), the testing appeared to be warranted and appropriately conducted. Those
incidents that were closed were characterized by implementing appropriate correc-
tive action(s) involving both procedural and design changes as needed. All told,
NASA's response to the incidents and resolution of the causes identified to date
reflected high professionalism and adherence to the policy of "safety first, schedule
second."
The SSME program continued the development of the Block II configuration, which
should be a major safety improvement. The Panel has favored the continued testing
of the Block II engine after its certification in order to define its true operating limits.
This could lead to the certification of a higher power setting for use in aborts and
would improve safety.
Another area of major Space Shuttle activity relates to the organization of and
responsibilities for Space Shuttle operations. The transition to a single prime con-
tractor under the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) continued smoothly.
NASA and the SFOC contractor also began examinations of privatization of the
Space Shuttle operations. Although these efforts have not created any immediate
safety concerns, the long-range implications of declining personnel numbers and
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potential skill mix imbalances are being watched. These issues are discussed more
fully in a separate section of this report.
The general state of the Integrated Logistics System (ILS) is healthy despite the need
for continuing tradeoffs. Examination of statistics shows that all the measurement
parameters, such as problem reports, component repair summaries, shelf stock status,
and scheduled and unscheduled maintenance actions, are at a satisfactory level. The
principal concerns are cannibalization, component repair and turnaround times, and
loss of spares available due to obsolescence and vendors going out of business.
The "integrated management" of the logistics and support programs under the
United Space Alliance (USA) appears to be working very well, and the extensive
backgrounds and administrative experience of the senior personnel result in a cohe-
sive and forward-looking concept. Continuity for the next working generation of
management appears to be high on the list of management priorities.
OPERATIONS/PROCESSING
Finding #1
Operations and processing in accordance with the Space Flight Operations Contract
(SFOC) have been satisfactory. Nevertheless, lingering concerns include: the danger
of not keeping foremost the overarching goal of safety before schedule before cost;
the tendency in a success-oriented environment to overlook the need for continued
fostering of frank and open discussion; the press of budget inhibiting the mainte-
nance of a well-trained NASA presence on the work floor; and the difficulty of a
continued cooperative search for the most meaningful measures of operations and
processing effectiveness.
Recommendation #1a
Both NASA and the SFOC contractor, USA, should reaffirm at frequent intervals
the dedication to safety before schedule before cost.
Recommendation #1b
NASA should develop and promulgate training and career paths leading to qualifi-
cation for senior NASA Space Shuttle management positions.
Recommendation #1c
NASA should continue to ensure that a trained and qualified Government person-
nel presence is maintained on the work floor.
Recommendation # I d
NASA and USA should continue to search for, develop, test, and establish the most
meaningful measures of operations and processing effectiveness possible.
Finding #2
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has been successfully phasing in the structured
surveillance process for safety and quality for some time. The development of metrics
using structured surveillance information has lagged data collection.
Recommendation #2
KSC should continue to expand the use of structured surveillance and to focus effort
on the development of valid and reliable metrics to assess program performance from
structured surveillance results.
Finding #3
NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) auditors at KSC overseeing opera-
tions requiring Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) are not
certified for SCAPE.
Recommendation #3
In order to be in a position to conduct valid safety and quality audits of SCAPE oper-
ations, NASA should ensure that personnel involved are certified so that, when
necessary, they can observe the tasks while they are performed.
Finding #4
To compensate for skills deficiencies related to staff departures from KSC, both
NASA and USA are making extensive use of cross-training of personnel, both tech-
nicians and engineers. Individuals who have been cross-trained also should have
recent "hands-on" experience before they undertake a cross-trained task.
Recommendation #4
NASA and USA should develop and use valid and reliable measures of the readi-
ness of personnel to take on tasks for which they have been trained but on which
they have only limited or episodic experience. The cross-training program could
include a regularly scheduled rotation of duties so that the multiply trained individ-
ual has the opportunity to employ all of the acquired skills and knowledge at
appropriate intervals.
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Finding #5
The reduction of Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPs) at KSC has
significantly lagged the downsizing of NASA quality personnel responsible for pro-
cessing these GMIPs. This has resulted in an expanded workload among remaining
NASA quality inspectors and made it more difficult to conduct analyses needed to
identify further GMIP reductions. There has been a similar reduction of NASA
safety inspectors and engineers at KSC without a commensurate reduction in over-
sight requirements while, at the same time, the addition of new safety audit or insight
responsibilities has taken place.
Recommendation #5
Any downsizing of personnel by both NASA and USA should be preceded by the
reduction of commensurate workload associated with Space Shuttle processing, such
as reduction of GMIPs and NASA safety inspections.
EXTERNAL TANK (ET)
Finding #6
The Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT) has completed its design certification review,
and proof tests on the first tank have been satisfactorily passed. The only remaining
test to complete certification of the SLWT is the cryogenic loading test that will be
run on the first production tank on the launch pad. The diligent attention that has
been given to quality control, particularly to material inspection and weld integrity,
has made this program successful.
Recommendation #6
NASA should ensure that the current manufacturing and quality control procedures
continue to be rigidly adhered to and conscientiously followed in production.
Finding #7
The design requirements for the SLWT include operating with a maximum Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) power of only 106%, even at abort conditions. The
Space Shuttle program has approved a baseline plan to examine the possibility of cer-
tifying the Space Shuttle for intact aborts at a 109% SSME power setting.
Recommendation #7
NASA should complete its evaluation of a 109% power setting for intact aborts as
soon as practicable and reevaluate the ability of the SLWT to accommodate this
higher power setting.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR (RSRM)
Finding #8
Obsolescence changes to the RSRM processes, materials, and hardware are continu-
ous because of changing regulations and other issues impacting RSRM suppliers. It is
extremely prudent to qualify all changes in timely, large-scale Flight Support Motor
(FSM) firings prior to produce/ship/fly. NASA has recently reverted from its planned
12-month FSM firing interval to tests on 18-month intervals.
Recommendation #8
Potential safety risks outweigh the small amount of money that might be saved by
scheduling the FSM motor tests at 18-month intervals rather than 12 months.
NASA should realistically reassess the test intervals for FSM static test firings to
ensure that they are sufficiently frequent to qualify, prior to motor flight, the contin-
uing large number of materials, process, and hardware changes.
LOGISTICS
Finding #9
Support of the Space Shuttle fleet with operational spares has been maintained by
the effective efforts of the logistics function. While spares support has been adequate
for the current flight rate, any increase in flight rate might not be supportable.
Recommendation #9
Although NASA has established programs for dealing with suppliers and bringing
additional component overhaul "in house," efforts in these areas need to be contin-
uously reexamined to speed up the restoration and upgrading of line-replaceable
units. Such efforts are especially needed to eliminate "dead" time while units are
awaiting restoration.
Finding # 10
Transition and development of the logistics tasks for the orbiter and its ground oper-
ations under the SFOC are proceeding efficiently and according to plan.
Recommendation #10
NASA and USA should continue the task of management integration of the for-
merly separate logistics contracts and retain and expand the roles of the experienced
logistics specialists therein.
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Finding # 11
As reported last year, long-term projections are still suggesting increasing cannibal-
ization rates, increasing component repair turnaround times, and loss of repair
capability for the Space Shuttle logistics programs. If the present trend is not
arrested, support difficulties may arise in the next 3 or 4 years.
Recommendation #11
NASA and USA should reexamine and take action to reverse the more worrying
trends highlighted by the statistical trend data.
B. INTERNATIONALSPACESTATION(ISS)PROGRAM
The start of deployment of the ISS was delayed because of problems in the delivery
of the Russian-built Service Module. The additional development time is being used
by NASA to permit some integrated testing of modules at KSC before launch. This
testing is an excellent step that should improve both the safety and operability of the
station on-orbit. The additional time is also fortuitous for the development of soft-
ware and the caution and warning system that are behind schedule. Details on
software issues are presented in a separate section of this report.
The handling of meteoroid and debris risks to the ISS progressed well during the year,
although the processes for collision avoidance and maneuvering are still not final-
ized. The development of the X-38 vehicle that is intended to become the basis for
a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) also moved ahead. The CRV development schedule,
however, is extremely optimistic. Any delay in the operational date for NASA's CRV
will mean a longer reliance on Soyuz capsules and attached Space Shuttles. This will
constrain ISS operations and may lead to safety problems. It is important for the
long-term safety of the ISS that a realistic CRV design and deployment schedule be
finalized as soon as possible. This will permit operational plans to be devised that
adequately take into account issues such as the service life of the Soyuz.
Finding #12
Node #1 was shipped to KSC before completion, and it is planned or anticipated that
other lSS hardware will be shipped before qualification tests are completed. This dis-
rupts the desirable continuity of effort and can lead to safety problems.
Recommendation #12
NASA should ensure that ISS assemblies shipped before completion of the manu-
facturing, testing, and qualification processes have been carefully scrutinized to make
sure that no safety-related steps are subverted.
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Finding # 13
The ISS Phase I Shuttle-Mir program has reaffirmed what was learned on Skylab:
that a manned space station can be surprisingly resilient in emergency situations.
Much has been learned from the operations on Mir to date and much more may be
learned from continued analysis of joint operations on Mir.
Recommendation #13
The 1SS team should continue to examine the Shuttle-Mir program carefully for
examples from which ISS operations can benefit and to provide policies and proce-
dures to implement effective action should similar events occur on the ISS. The
effort should be expanded beyond Mir to focus as well on possible weaknesses in the
ISS design and operations. The ISS should assemble a special team, including per-
sons with system-level perspectives as well as with design, operations, and human
factors experience, to address these issues.
Finding #14
Radiation exposures of U.S. astronauts recorded over several Mir missions of 115 to
180 days duration have been approximately 10.67 to 17.20 REM. If similar levels of
exposure are experienced during ISS operations, the cumulative effects of radiation
could affect crew health and limit the number of ISS missions to which crewmem-
bers could be assigned.
Recommendation #14
Determine projected ISS crew radiation exposure levels. If appropriate, based on
study results, initiate a design program to modify habitable ISS modules to minimize
such exposures or limit crew stay time as required.
Finding # 15
Although considerable progress has been made during this past year in ISS Caution
and Warning (C&W) system design, systems engineering is still not sufficiently evi-
dent in the whole spectrum of alarm and warning, situation assessment, and damage
control and repair.
Recommendation #15
Initiate a high-priority systems engineering review of the C&W system to define a
path for development and implementation of fully integrated alarm, situation assess-
ment, countermeasure functions and crew actions. Finalize and document C&W
system design requirements.
C. COMPUTi HARDWARE/SOFTWARE
Software is a major safety-critical part of both the Space Shuttle and ISS. Its devel-
opment also represents a significant determinant of schedule and cost. Although
much progress has been made in the software development processes used and in the
coding of the various software products themselves, the Panel retains several con-
cerns. These are reflected in the specific findings and recommendations below.
Finding # 16
The 1SS software development schedule is almost impossibly tight. If something else
does not cause a further delay in ISS deployment, software development may very
well do so. The decision this year to add integrated testing of some modules at KSC
is a very positive step for safety. However, there is no room in the schedule for
required changes that may be discovered during this testing.
Recommendation #16
NASA should realistically reevaluate the achievable ISS software development and
test schedule and be willing to delay the ISS deployment if necessary rather than
potentially sacrifice safety.
Finding #17
NASA does not yet have adequate plans for the long-term maintenance of the soft-
ware development tools being used to produce the ISS software.
Recommendation #17
NASA should recognize the importance of maintaining its software development
tools, plan now for how these are to be maintained over a period of decades, and pro-
vide adequate funding to support this activity.
Finding # 18
The computer system being developed for the ISS is already at a point where NASA
should begin planning for upgrading it. The ISS program presently has no plans for
upgrading the ISS computer system.
Recommendation #18
NASA should upgrade the ISS computer system as soon as possible and coordinate the
upgrade with its solution to the long-term development tool maintenance problem.
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Finding # 19
The Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS) program at KSC has not been
provided with funding for Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) that is
safety critical for a software effort of this size.
Recommendation #19
The CLCS should be provided with adequate funding for software IV&V.
D. AERONAUTICSANDSPACETRANSPORTATIONTECHNOLOGY
The NASA Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology Enterprise places
great emphasis on safety of its flight programs while striving to increase significantly
the effectiveness and competitiveness of U.S. aviation, both civil and military. There
is greatly increased cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
update the Nation's air traffic management capabilities and to begin new initiatives
directed at significantly increasing safety of civil aviation. The emphasis on better
and more timely weather information for the flight deck along with the error-proof
digital avionics effort would appear to be absolutely necessary elements of the acci-
dent reduction effort.
There are also many ongoing technology projects, such as aging aircraft and crack
detection, the Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments (AGATE), air-
craft noise reduction, tire traction testing, and icing research, that contribute to
increased safety. The High Speed Research program includes atmosphere and propul-
sion research for defining requirements for future supersonic civil transport aircraft.
These technology advancement programs often lead to flight experiments at the
Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC).
The airworthiness and flight readiness process at DFRC is excellent and truly places
heavy emphasis on the principle of safety first and mission schedule second. This is
necessary because there are several flight programs at DFRC that have inherent
safety risks that deserve special emphasis. These include: the Linear Aerospike SR-71
Experiment (LASRE); the F-106 Eclipse; and the Pathfinder solar-powered unoccu-
pied air vehicle.
The X-33 and X-34 flight research vehicles are laying the groundwork for future
space transportation systems. Because the X-33 extended range flight tests will
involve flight over populated areas, the Panel will pay close attention to the plans for
these flights.
The Panel is concerned that a second (research) cockpit is not being installed in the
Boeing 757 at the Langley Research Center due to funding constraints. The safety
enhancements that may be derived from testing with this modification should be re-
evaluated.
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The continuing downsizing of NASA personnel has the potential of leading to a
long-term shortfall of critical engineering and technical competencies. Nonetheless,
the record of the agency in 1997 has been impressive with a series of successful Space
Shuttle launches on time and with a minimum of safety-related problems. However,
further erosion of the personnel base could affect safety and increase flight risk
because it increases the likelihood that essential work steps might be omitted. Also,
the inability to hire younger engineers and technicians will almost surely create a
future capabilities problem.
Among the Panel's concerns are:
• Lack of Center flexibility to manage people within identified budget levels rather
than arbitrary personnel ceilings
• Erosion of the skill and experience mix at KSC
• Lack of a proactive program of training and cross-training at some locations
• Continuing freeze on hiring of engineers and technical workers needed to main-
tain a desirable mix of skills and experience
• Difficulty of hiring younger workers (e.g., co-op students and recent graduates)
• Staffing levels inadequate to pursue ISO 9000 certification
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A. SPACESHUTTLEPROGRAM
OPERATIONS/PROCESING
Ref: Finding #1
Neither the United Space Alliance (USA) nor NASA has yet laid to rest the per-
ception among NASA employees that the bottom-line requirement of the contractor
to make a profit will, in the end, prompt the contractor to take shortcuts and com-
promise safety. This perception exists at all ranks, from astronauts through engineers
to quality people on the work floor.
There is considerable evidence that the current outstanding cooperation between
NASA and contractor personnel is the product of long years of association. For
example, frank and open discussion is now the norm in NASA/contractor relation-
ships. Unfortunately, it is not clear that there are definitive plans for ensuring that
such relationships will continue to exist when the current generation of NASA and
contractor managers leaves the program.
Presence on the work floor is key to gaining true insight into contractor practices. In
addition, the Space Shuttle program's excellent safety record is due in large part to
the presence of knowledgeable people on the work floor. Any change in this presence
must be carefully considered.
Presently established measures of effectiveness for contractor performance appear for
the most part to be adequate, but they tend to be measures of the "low hanging fruit."
Other more meaningful measures are undoubtedly available; they just have to be dis-
covered. A program to do that must be pursued with vigor.
Ref: Finding #2
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and its contractors began using structured sur-
veillance several years ago on low criticality tasks. The idea was to conserve resources
and remove the Oovernment from direct involvement in operational tasks by plac-
ing the responsibility for quality and safety directly on the technician performing the
work. The approach has worked well in other industries, particularly airlines.
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1997
AEROSPACE SAFETY
ADVISORY PANEL
Now that there is significant experience with the structured surveillance approach, a
cautious expansion appears warranted. This expansion could possibly encompass
more low criticality ("crit Y') tasks as well as selected tasks of higher criticality. Valid
and reliable metrics to indicate how well the structured surveillance approach is
achieving its goals are needed. These metrics do not yet exist. Their development
and validation should precede any extension of structured surveillance beyond its
present focus on low criticality tasks that are routinely verified during a subsequent
activity.
Ref: Finding #3
As NASA has downsized its staff at KSC, it has not been possible to control totally
the composition of staff departures. This has reduced technical capabilities in some
critical areas. As a result, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Office does not
have anyone qualified in Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble
(SCAPE) operations. At the time of the Panel's review, the S&MA personnel
assigned to assessing SCAPE operations had not had any firsthand experience with
SCAPE and were not SCAPE certified so they could not witness these operations.
This means that S&MA's structured surveillance (when it is fully operational) will
not be able to cover SCAPE activities effectively. Working with reactive propellants
is a hazardous operation that requires training and experience. It is likely that some
SCAPE experience is required in order to be an effective auditor of a SCAPE oper-
ation.
To counter this problem, NASA should enumerate the safety-critical operations that
must be audited. Every effort should then be made to retain or engage NASA per-
sonnel for S&MA audit activities who are trained and experienced in the defined
safety-critical activities. If this is not possible, existing personnel should be trained in
the operation being audited. This will help ensure that the audit activities are as
effective as possible in validating the processes used by the contractor.
Ref: Finding #4
As a result of unplanned departures of personnel, both NASA and USA at KSC are
experiencing a shortfall of skills in some critical areas. To compensate, both the gov-
ernment and the contractor have instituted cross-training programs. These types of
efforts have a great potential for compensating for temporary skill imbalances.
Personnel who are scheduled for cross-training probably already have an excellent
understanding of overall Space Shuttle systems.
One potential problem with cross-training is that training itself is usually not a com-
plete substitute for thorough and recent experience. Thus, cross-trained personnel
may still not be fully ready to step into an assignment in their new area of compe-
tence. At present, there are no good indicators of the readiness of cross-trained
personnel to step into a different position. The development of such readiness indi-
cators would add greatly to the confidence management could have in utilizing these
cross-trained people. Until valid indicators are available, cross-trained people should
be used in safety-critical situations only if there is adequate supervision. It would also
be beneficial to develop a regular rotation of the cross-trained workforce among all
of the specialties for which they are prepared to provide "hands-on" experience. This
will help ensure appropriate readiness as well as sufficient training.
Ref: Finding #5
In prior reports, the Panel has cautioned that reductions in NASA and USA per-
sonnel should not outdistance the reductions in workload associated with those
positions. Nonetheless, in a transition of the magnitude currently taking place in
terms of downsizing and the shift of processing responsibilities from NASA to USA,
it is not surprising that these relationships will on occasion get out of phase.
For example, the continuing downsizing of NASA space flight center personnel, in
conjunction with the shift of NASA responsibilities under the SFOC from active
involvement in Space Shuttle processing to one of providing "insight," assumes a sig-
nificant reduction of Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPs).
Unfortunately, this GMIP reduction has been progressing very slowly. As a result, the
reduced NASA personnel are having to process virtually as many GMIPs as they did
when prior employment levels were in place. This continuing high workload, in
many instances, has made it difficult to conduct the analyses that are required to
identify GMIPs that can be safely eliminated.
The transition to the SFOC has also placed more responsibility for job site safety on
the technicians themselves. The approach of making the touch labor workforce
responsible for safety without the direct involvement of NASA or USA inspectors
has proved effective in analogous environments. However, implementing this
approach at KSC should take account of several unique challenges. First, there is a
heritage of multiple inspections and direct oversight by NASA and contractor per-
sonnel. Thus, the shift to structured safety approaches is a significant departure.
Second, the shift is taking place simultaneously with significant downsizing by both
NASA and USA. Third, the reduction in oversight duties for NASA inspectors has
been somewhat delayed while audit or "insight" duties have been added. Fourth,
attrition of NASA safety personnel has left the Government workforce shorthanded
to accomplish both GMIPs and insight tasks.
It is probable that problems or upsets due to these unique factors are not permanent
and will dissipate as personnel gain greater familiarity with the new approach to
Space Shuttle processing. In the interim, NASA and contractor management should
be sensitive to the potential for transitional problems and remain vigilant. This must
involve assessments of metrics and a continuing direct involvement on the work
floor. It is also desirable to maintain active communications with the workforce on
the progress of the transition efforts.
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1997
..:::!_(_ :_:_
_g_" iiiF
AEROSPACE SAFETY
ADVISORY PANEL
<iiiiil;   i!iiiiiiiii!iiiiii 
_iiiii_::¸¸ ::i_iiii::_ili_:
EXTERNAL TANK (ET)
Ref: Finding #6
The proof test of the new Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT) consists of a series of
stress tests run at room temperature, with some of the stresses in the tank walls at
levels less than will be experienced in flight. The predicted improvement in mater-
ial properties at cryogenic temperatures is then used to show that flight stresses will
be acceptable. This is the same approach that has been used successfully on all prior
external tanks for the Space Shuttle. There is, however, a significant difference from
the previous external tanks in that most of the SLWT is made from 2195 aluminum-
lithium alloy. This alloy has unique material properties and has had far less operating
experience than the 2219 aluminum alloy used on all previous external tanks.
Welding procedures (including repair techniques) for the 2195 aluminum-lithium
alloy have been successfully developed and demonstrated on a test article and on the
first production units. These procedures are different and less forgiving than those
used for the 2219 alloy and must be followed very carefully. The External Tank
Project at Marshall Space Flight Center and the contractor are well aware of these
concerns. Full support for their continued oversight of production is warranted.
Ref: Finding #7
The Block I1 Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is being certified to operate at
104.5% power setting for most of the International Space Station (ISS) missions, at
106% for a few ISS missions with heavy payloads, and at 109% for abort. The abort
mode would be required, for example, if one of the SSMEs were to fail.
The maximum SSME power setting for design of the SLWT, however, has been lim-
ited to 106% SSME power for abort. The Space Shuttle program has approved a
baseline plan to examine the possibility of certifying the Space Shuttle for intact
aborts at a 109% SSME power setting. Because the total thrust from two SSMEs at
109% would be significantly lower than from three engines at 106% power, NASA
is encouraged to complete its review of SLWT design limits and raise them to the
highest test-verified power level compatible with the flight rules for abort.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR (RSRM)
Ref: Finding #8
The RSRM manufacturer, Thiokol, expends a significant forward-looking effort in
dealing with issues such as obsolescence, environmental constraints, and loss of sup-
pliers. These factors, however, are frequently not under Thiokol's control.
Reasonable projections of obsolescence can become difficult because of the large
number of tier and subtier suppliers for whom business conditions and regulations can
change at any time. A key element of verification for many of the necessary changes
is to qualify the change in a Flight Support Motor (FSM) static test motor firing prior
to incorporating it into flight production. It is necessary to have an FSM schedule
that always ensures a timely static test opportunity. NASA has recently reverted from
its planned 12-month FSM firing interval to tests at 18-month intervals. The current
rate of changes points to the need for FSM motor firings every 12 months.
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LOGISTICS
Ref: Finding #9
NASA continues its laudable efforts to bring "in house" the repair and overhaul of
components that the original equipment manufacturer will no longer agree to per-
form. The time required for these activities is still excessive and needs to be
continuously reexamined in an attempt to reduce flow times and, hence, increase
spares availability. Currently, the repair processes have considerable "dead" time due
to delays in starting failure analysis of removed units. Total repair turnaround time
could be significantly shortened if these delays were eliminated. Obsolescence, loss
of suppliers, ecological demands, and economic pressures exacerbate this situation.
NASA continues to use Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) removed from the orbiter
undergoing an Orbiter Maintenance and Down Period (OMDP) overhaul to support
the operating fleet. There is nothing wrong with such efforts if the LRU must be
removed anyway as part of the OMDP. However, any unplanned removal of compo-
nents increases the risk of improper re-installation or damage.
Although there are no approved plans to increase Space Shuttle flight rates, it should
be noted that the current level of spares might not be capable of supporting increased
flight rates without significant changes in the repair processes or increases in spares
inventory.
Ref: Finding # 10
The synergy that was developing last year under the USA banner among logistics
personnel from the principal contractors, notably Lockheed-Martin and Boeing
North American, has apparently blossomed and is encouraging some new thinking
with respect to control systems, performance measurement, and personnel efficiencies.
The watchword appears to be "what is good for the logistics system?" rather than slav-
ishly following the previous contractual practices. The enthusiastic reexamination
and, in some cases, realignment of systems, which may have stagnated from the early
1980's when they were installed and implemented, is yielding excellent results.
An example of this kind of development is a detailed study of a replacement system
to the now outdated Kennedy Inventory Management System (KIMS). The replace-
ment utilizes a commercial off-the-shelf system and will be completed around August
1998. The old KIMS will be gradually phased out, terminating entirely by the mil-
lennium.
Another good example of system modernization and cost-effective streamlining is
contained in the Boeing-Rocketdyne SSME logistics approach. The SSME
Component Optimization Program (COP) consists of a model initially "sized" for
some 200 LRUs and analyzes asset requirements, abnormal usage spikes, and varying
demand scenarios. These data are used as working tools by the spares analysts, and
initial indications show that significant time savings and increased confidence levels
arebeingobtainedbyuseofthesystem.Anevaluationofthepaybackbeingafforded
bytheCOPsystemwill bemadearlyin 1998.
Ref: Finding #11
The general characteristics of the logistics and support programs are well controlled
in all of the principal contractor programs and show "green" on the green-amber-red
scales. Nevertheless, there is enough concern in a few cases to warrant more specific
corrective action. For example, obsolescence-induced difficulties with high value and
longer lead-time procurement items of electronics (e.g., the Inertial Measurement
Unit and the Master Events Controller) require decisive action. Similarly, a number
of mechanical components, such as the Freon disconnect and the two-way solenoid
valve necessitate urgent attention.
The NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot operated by USA at Cape Canaveral is provid-
ing an essential and generally satisfactory component repair and rebuild service. Its
limited capability and capacity, however, are resulting in some instances from a grow-
ing backlog and consequently increased repair turnaround times. Such issues demand
intensive tracking and foUowup by NASA and USA to avoid downstream crises.
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1997
_i_ _'_
AEROSPACE SAFETY
ADVISORY PANEL
i:iiiii_iiiiiii:!& iiiiiii:
......ii"  !iiiiii ,,  iiiii 
B. INTERNATIONALSPACESTATION(ISS)PROGRAM
Ref: Finding # 12
The manufacturing and assembly process for the ISS is a success-dependent program.
Every element must be complete and thoroughly tested prior to launch to orbit. With
few exceptions, the modules of the ISS will only be tested as a combined entity after
assembly in orbit. This is a challenging task, with associated safety and programmatic
risks.
Node #1 was shipped from Boeing at Marshall Space Flight Center to KSC in an
unfinished state. There exist current plans to ship other units prior to completion of
some component qualification tests. If schedules require, future modules may even be
shipped to KSC before completion of assembly. Whatever the reasons for these
actions, such practices can open the door to potential mistakes or errors of omission.
Something can slip through the cracks and only be discovered on orbit during or after
assembly. NASA should ensure that any ISS assemblies that are shipped before com-
pletion of the manufacturing, testing, and certification processes are carefully
scrutinized to make sure that no safety-related steps are subverted.
Ref: Finding #13
From a safety point of view, it is clear that the Shuttle-Mir (ISS Phase 1) program
has been a success. The well-publicized operational problems of the last year have
diverted attention from the reality that this multicultural, multilingual team has
worked together very well. Complex joint U.S.-Russian activities have been worked
out in near-real time, demonstrating the ability to continue to innovate and to
accomplish heavy workloads even under high-stress conditions.
The ISS team is focusing on the lessons to be learned from these activities as well as
from Skylab and is beginning to develop standard procedures to handle similar cir-
cumstances on the ISS. The collision with the Progress module, the several oxygen
generator problems, and the multiple computer failures have all served as strong indi-
cators that, for safe operations, it is imperative to plan ahead and provide and train
on well-thought-out emergency procedures. It is also prudent to anticipate the need
for spare parts/assemblies and prepare for contingencies by storing on board a suffi-
cient stock of critical items for operational repairs.
While the ISS design differs from Mir in many respects, much can be learned by using
the Mir experience to develop failure scenarios related to the ISS. These can then be
assessed to determine whether the ISS system is capable of handling the posited prob-
lems or situations at least as well as was proved on Mir. In order to best undertake
these analyses, a multidisciplinary team comprising systems design, operational, and
human factors expertise should be formed.
Ref: Finding #14
The 1-year Department of Energy limits for radiation exposure for "radiation work-
ers" are:
300 REM to the skin
50 REM to the blood-forming organs
Extended deployments by astronauts in ISS could result in radiation exposures that
exceed those limits. Radiation exposure is cumulative over a lifetime. Design features
of the ISS to minimize crew exposure to ionizing radiation are unknown. The dan-
gers of exposure to ionizing radiation should be confronted now with conservative
module, system, and equipment designs that minimize exposure. Otherwise, crew stay
time may have to be limited.
Ref: Finding #15
One of the more safety-critical subsystems in the ISS is the Caution and Warning
(C&W) system. The ISS C&W system is far more complex than previous alarm-only
systems in that it will incorporate sensors, processors, displays, communications, and
data distribution subsystems and have the ability to conduct certain recovery actions
from remote locations. Yet, for a variety of reasons, the system remains immature.
The draft Caution and Warning System Description Document states that: "The ISS
C&W system is designed to inform and assist the onboard crew in resolving and
responding to hazardous conditions, or situations that may endanger ISS resources,
the lives of the crew, or mission success." To date, the primary focus has been on
annunciation of hazardous conditions. The Panel remains concerned that the appli-
cation of a systems engineering approach to C&W is lagging.
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C. COMPUTERHARDWARE/SOFTWARE
Ref: Finding #16
NASA is well aware of the ISS software schedule risk. It has been noted by all levels
of management. Considerable effort has been expended to try to resolve this prob-
lem. Fifty additional experienced people have been added by the contractor to
support the software effort. There are meetings at least every 2 weeks to work on soft-
ware schedule problems. Thirty million dollars has been allocated to create an ISS
System Integration Lab (ISIL) to assist the integrated testing of hardware and soft-
ware.
Nevertheless, NASA has not found the solution to the software schedule problem.
Software specialists believe they have absolutely zero margin, and they see [SS assem-
bly flight 5A as a major hurdle. Some of the software schedule charts reviewed called
for software being needed (and delivered) before it was scheduled to be completed.
Even though there is great schedule pressure, no one told the Panel that they felt that
they are or would be pressured into sacrificing safety for schedule. However, this
always remains a concern.
Ref: Finding #17
NASA has placed emphasis on using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software
for the Space Station. There is a quandary that results from adopting that decision as
opposed to developing specific, unique software. COTS products change frequently,
both in response to market needs and to increased hardware capabilities (currently
arriving on the scene at least once a year). That creates a major problem for long-
lived systems such as the ISS. The COTS software vendors are highly unlikely to
maintain their systems for today's (or yesterday's) computers for time periods on the
order of decades. They will upgrade their systems for the then-current hardware.
After a relatively short time, NASA may lose support for its software development
tools.
NASA faces multiple problems from this situation. First, as inevitable errors in the
development tools are found, NASA must address the question of repairing them or
developing workarounds. Even if NASA "freezes" the versions of the COTS tools
being used and uses workarounds for problems that result, there is a larger problem
looming related to computer hardware upgrades. Eventually, NASA will have to
upgrade the computer platforms supporting the ISS. When that happens, it will be
necessary to utilize the tools to regenerate the software for the new platforms.
However, the tools themselves will first have to be retargeted to the new platforms.
Two problems arise with this. In some cases, there will be no COTS upgrades to the
new platforms. In others, the COTS product will have evolved considerably, and
major recertification would be necessary.
NASAmustbepreparedto assumesomelevelofresponsibilityformaintainingthe
softwaretoolsthat it is using,eventhoughtheyareCOTSproducts.It facesa
numberof complexdecisionsin maintainingitsCOTStools.NASA mustchoose
betweendifferentversionsofcompilersandcodegeneratorsandevendifferentver-
sionsof thelanguagebeingused.Of particularconcernis themaintenanceof the
Adacompiler.NoAdacompilervendorhasproducedahigh-qualitycompileruntil
atleastheirsecond-or(moreusually)third-generationproduct.Thesecompilersare
extremelycomplex,andit seemslikelythattherewill beproblemsin maintaining
them.Considerationofmovingto Ada95wouldseemanalternativeworthconsid-
ering.
Nosimpleinexpensivesolutionisknown.It isimportant,however,thatthisproblem
beaddressednow,beforetheproblemsbecomeareality,assomeofthepotentialsolu-
tionalternativescouldnolongerbeavailablein thefutureif theproblemisdeferred.
Ref: Finding #18
NASA's decision to use Intel 80386-based processors for the space station was made
in the mid-1980s, more than 10 years ago. While the 80386 was a good choice at the
time and had a long service life, today's products are now two or three generations
beyond the 80386. The key issues are not solely, or even principally, hardware per-
formance. Rather, it is a matter that NASA is rapidly headed toward operating its
COTS products in a world devoid of any other users, as described in the discussion
of the previous finding. Moreover, component replacement problems will eventually
become an issue. As the Space Shuttle has also shown, there is a never-ending need
for upgraded hardware capabilities to increase safety and to take advantage of new
technical developments in other areas.
Given the present problem of long-term maintenance of tools and that eventually it
will be necessary to upgrade the computer hardware on the ISS, there is likely an
advantage to beginning consideration of an upgrade at this time. Some of the solu-
tion alternatives to the long-term tool maintenance problem described in the
previous finding might be more attractive if it were known that a hardware upgrade
was also being scheduled (e.g., whether or not to change the language being used to
Ada 95).
The Panel recognizes that it could be difficult to work on this problem now because
of the severe schedule problem presently being experienced. However, it is an impor-
tant problem that will only become larger with time. Its consideration should not be
deferred. A small team should be able to develop appropriate upgrade strategies.
Ref: Finding #19
The Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS) development program appears
to be proceeding well. The program includes a massive software effort, with conserv-
ative code size estimates of 3 million lines of source code. Therefore, CLCS needs a
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strong Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) activity. Unfortunately, the
CLCS program has not been provided with funding earmarked for IV&V.
While a substantial part of the code to be written is an adaptation of existing code,
there is little in the way of documentation or requirements for the existing systems.
An important activity, then, is to generate requirements and documentation for
CLCS. The code development is proceeding in parallel with the development of
these requirements and documentation.
The CLCS code is being developed in a series of releases, approximately one every
6 months. This makes the progress of the project visible and provides an opportunity
for feedback and revision of requirements at reasonable points in the project. The
CECS incremental development approach can be a very useful method for develop-
ing complex software. It can, however, also complicate IV&V activities,
necessitating an assessment at each stage of the development.
The development team that has been assembled to work on the CLCS project
appears to be very strong. Nevertheless, given the scale of the project and its safety-
critical nature, incorporation of adequate IV&V is essential It is also essential that
the quality of the software development not be compromised to fund IV&V, as this
would be counterproductive.
D. PERSONNEL
During 1997, the Panel made a point of assessing the employment situation and out-
look at each of the NASA Centers visited. Special attention was paid to the
situation at KSC, JSC, and MSFC--those Centers most directly associated with the
development and operation of the Space Shuttle and the International Space
Station. This concern reflected the unanimous view of the Panel that NASA should
not permit short-term budgetary pressures to erode the critical competencies that will
be required to maintain this country's leadership in space in the 21st century.
The continuing authority to offer a limited "buyout" of NASA employees in
exchange for a voluntary resignation, coupled with normal attrition rates, has been
sufficient, so far, to avoid a highly destructive involuntary Reduction-in-Force (RIF).
Due, in part, to the broader range of technical job skills that exist, JSC and/vlSFC
have been able to manage their declining workforce in a way that has retained
younger employees and avoided any serious gaps in job skills and experience. KSC
has found it more difficult to manage its workforce in a proactive way: its downsizing
target is proportionately larger than JSC and MSFC, and fewer opportunities exist to
shift employees into alternative jobs. The potential for shortfalls in key competen-
cies clearly exists.
This potential is exacerbated by the continuing freeze on new hires. Although it is
theoretically possible for a NASA Center to receive authority to fill a documented
critical skills shortage, the Panel has found that this authority is rarely exercised.
Moreover, the job freeze has all but killed a normal pattern of bringing "new blood"
into the Agency to replace those who are leaving through retirements, attrition, or
voluntary resignations. Where it has been established practice to hire a dozen or so co-
op students, along with outstanding "fresh-out" engineering graduates, NASA
Centers currently find these traditional channels of identifying the next generation of
leadership all but closed. Although these losses are not likely to be noticed in the near
term, they clearly place in jeopardy U.S. leadership in space 10 or 20 years from now.
An arbitrary job freeze is an abdication of management responsibility. Given the bud-
getary constraints that have been imposed by Congress, it makes more sense to
provide NASA Centers maximum flexibility to manage people proactively within
identified budget levels rather than focus on arbitrary personnel ceilings. Such an
approach is fully consistent with the philosophy of NASA Headquarters delegating
to the Centers both program responsibility and program authority. Initiatives such as
partnering with other Centers, increased use of postdocs/interns/students, limited
hiring of fresh-outs, co-ops, and specialized skills, training and cross-training, and tar-
geted buyouts can avoid skills and experience shortfalls while also ensuring the
recruitment of NASA's next generation of leaders.
In addition, the management of NASA and USA should recognize the significant
shift that has taken place during the past several years within the job market for well-
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trained engineers. Private sector employers report hiring shortages in key engineer-
ing disciplines. Competition for top graduates is intense. NASA and USA must
respond positively to this competition if the Nation's space program is to retain its
reputation as a place for the "best and the brightest" among the current generation
of engineers.
MSFC and JSC have established a proactive skills census that is a useful tool in fore-
casting skills deficits so that remedial action can be initiated before a shortfall exists.
Other initiatives, such as Marshall's EDTec Center and the computer-based
Professional Development Initiative (PDI), are examples of innovative training tools
being developed to help maintain NASA's technical competencies.
Obtaining ISO 9000 certification can be a valuable exercise in introspection that can
lead to a better understanding of an organization's processes and, hence, a higher
quality product. To obtain ISO 9000 certification, an enterprise must meet certain
rigid standards for documenting and understanding its operations. It must then
defend its approaches and documentation as part of an independent examination.
NASA has set a goal for each of its enterprises of achieving ISO 9000 certification
within a reasonable period of time. The process of becoming certified, however, does
require a considerable amount of staff time. This time was not considered as part of
the Zero Base Review, and therefore personnel for this task were not included in
Center budgets. Without sufficient staffing, ISO 9000 certification activities have
the potential to intrude upon the normal work of NASA Centers, particularly when
the workload is already high. To avoid compromising the very quality that ISO 9000
certification is intended to enhance, NASA should adjust certification schedules, if
necessary, to permit more time for the process at those Centers that are already heav-
ily loaded.
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SUMMARY
NASA responded on August 11, 1997, to the "Findings and Recommendations"
from the February 1997 Annual Report. NASA's response to each report item is cat-
egorized by the Panel as "open, continuing, or closed." Open items are those on
which the Panel differs with the NASA response in one or more respects. They are
typically addressed by a new finding, recommendation, or observation in this report.
Continuing items involve concerns that are an inherent part of NASA operations or
have not progressed sufficiently to permit a final determination by the Panel. These
will remain a focus of the Panel's activities during 1998. Items considered answered
adequately are deemed closed.
Based on the Panel's review of the NASA response and the information gathered
during the 1997 period, the status of the recommendations made in the 1997 report
is presented on the following page.
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RECOMMENDATION
No. Subject
1 Consequences of Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC)
implementation
2 Training and experience of Space Shuttle supervisory personnel post-
SFOC implementation
3 Measurement of impact of downsizing on the safety of Space Shuttle
operations
4 Integrity of Space Shuttle processing quality assurance procedures
5 Operational upgrades to hardware, software, and logistics support for
Space Shuttle flight until at least 2010
6 Orbiter Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster valve in-flight leaks
7 Certification of a new gas generator valve module for the Improved
Auxiliary Power Unit (IAPU)
8 Future avionics software upgrades
9 Implementation of the Multi-Function Electronic Display System
(MEDS) in the orbiter
10 Alternate Turbopump Program High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
(ATP HPFTP)
11 Block 11 schedule
12 Block 11 cumulative test time at 109% power level
13 Application of side loads in Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)
Flight Support Motor (FSM) firings
14 Flight Support Motor firing schedule
15 Use of asbestos in Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) manufacture
16 Testing of the 2195 material and quality control procedures used in the
manufacture of each Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT)
17 Transition of logistics functions under Phase I of the Space Flight
Operations Contract (SFOC)
18 Increasing cannibalization rates, component repair turnaround times,
and loss of repair capability for the Space Shuttle
19 Space Shuttle component obsolescence
20 International Space Station (ISS) schedules
21 Meteoroid and orbital debris (M/OD) mitigation
22 Deficiency of collision avoidance and maneuver process
23 Development of Caution and Warning (C&W) System
24 ISS toxic detection and annunciation
25 ISS wireless communication system
26 Development of an ISS Crew Return Vehicle (CRV)
27 Software safety policy
28 Software assurance program roles and responsibilities
29 Use of Matrix X for ISS software
30 Documentation of firmware placed in ISS components
31 ISS software development process
32 Consolidation of NASA flight research aircraft at Dryden Flight
Research Center (DFRC)
33 Implementation of a wind tunnel inspection plan
34 NASA's aeronautics research program
35 Space Shuttle obsolescence
36 Firefighting preparedness and training
Status
Continuing
Continuing
Continuing
Closed
Continuing
Continuing
Continuing
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Open
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Continuing
Continuing
Continuing
Continuing
Open
Continuing
Continuing
Closed
Closed
Continuing
Open
Continuing
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Mr. Paul M. Johnstone
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
241%1 Old House Cove Road
St. Michaels, MD 21563
At_ I I _97
Dear Mr. Johnstone:
In accordance with your introductory letter dated
February 1997 to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
Annual Report, enclosed ks NASA's detailed response to
Section II, _Findings and Recommendations."
The ASAP's efforts in assisting NASA to maintain the
highest possible safety standards are commendable. Your
recommendations are highly regarded and continue to play an
important role in risk reduction in NASA programs.
We thank you and your Panel members for your valuable
contributions. ASAP recommendations receive the full
attention of NASA senior management. In particular, I
expect that N_A's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
will track resolution of these issues as part of their role
in independent assessment.
We welcome the continuance of this beneficial working
relationship with the Panel.
 a£1:Is  o  rdln
Enclosure
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Findings,Recommendations,andResponses
A. SPACESHUTTLEPROGRAM
OPERATIONS/PROCESSING
Finding #1
One consequence of the implementation of the Space Flight Operations Contract
(SF©C) is a reduction in opportunities for NASA personnel to maintain detailed,
day-to-day work floor interfaces with their contractor counterparts both at space
flight centers and major contractor facilities. This could compromise NASA's ability
to carry out its assessment function.
Recommendation #1
In order to carry out its assessment role, NASA must maintain some physical pres-
ence on the work floor at the space flight centers and major contractor facilities.
NASA must ensure that the people staffing these surveillance positions are and con-
tinue to be appropriately skilled, thoroughly knowledgeable about the Space Shuttle,
and sufficiently experienced with both the subsystem they oversee and the total
Space Shuttle system.
NASA Response to Recommendation #1 °
NASA concurs with the finding and is sensitive to the need to maintain a skilled and
capable workforce in both the management and technical functions necessary for
Space Shuttle program (SSP) success, and the Agency will work with the contractor
in establishing the eventual organizational roles and responsibilities to assure that
success. The transition process will be managed at a pace to ensure that necessary
skills are maintained within the Government/contractor workforce.
The assessment function that NASA will perform in the future Shuttle operations
architecture will require the maintenance of a solid skill base within the Agency.
NASA will retain the capability to review all anomalies in operations and system
performance, as well as all changes to operations and to systems. NASA's role in
requirements control will also provide continuous exposure to designs and operations
within the program. The participation of NASA engineering and management in
the development of Shuttle upgrades will provide further opportunity for the main-
tenance of an inherent skill base. Finally, there will be functional roles for NASA
personnel, such as astronauts, flight controllers, and mission directors, that will pro-
vide an avenue for skills development and maintenance.
Finding #2
It is not clear how NASA Space Shuttle supervisory personnel will be trained and
acquire the experience levels necessary to function effectively in senior management
positions when the SFOC is fully implemented and the traditional learning ladder
positions are staffed by the contractor.
Recommendation #2
NASA should develop and promulgate training and career paths leading to prepara-
tion and qualification as potential senior NASA Space Shuttle management.
NASA Response to Recommendation #2
NASA has an active commitment to the development of the skills of senior man-
agers for all functional areas of the Agency. Space Shuttle program senior managers
are generally products of both their in-line experiences as well as the NASA career
development programs. It is anticipated at this time that the roles for NASA per-
sonnel and the career development programs that have served NASA well to this
point will be sufficient to assure a continuation of highly qualified and capable senior
managers in the future. Given the evolving nature of the NASA and prime contrac-
tor roles and responsibilities for the SFOC operational model, it is reasonable to focus
special attention on this issue; the program will ensure that specific consideration is
given to management development in the transition plans being developed and
implemented across the program.
Finding #3
No objective measure has yet been developed, or is likely possible, that can shed sig-
nificant light on the impact of downsizing on the safety of Space Shuttle operations.
Recommendation #3
In the absence of a valid predictive safety metric, NASA should ensure that all func-
tions affected by downsizing and necessary for safe operations are assigned to people
who have the knowledge, skills, and time to carry them out.
NASA Response to Recommendation #3
NASA concurs; all of the contractors supporting the Space Shuttle program remain
committed to assuring that safety is the highest priority in every facet of the program.
The program recognizes the concerns that downsizing may raise, and it will assure
that knowledgeable and skilled individuals are assigned to all critical Shuttle func-
tions, including those being downsized. The plans for the transition of processes and
tasks under the SFOC specifically address the safety implications of the transition.
As an added assurance, the Shuttle program has required that the NASA Safety and
Mission Assurance (SMA) organizations review and concur on the transition plans.
Other program downsizing efforts have a similar emphasis on safety embedded in
them, and both program management and the SMA management are committed to
assure that this focus is not compromised.
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Finding #4
Postflight discovery of a wrench and an equipment name plate in the forward skirt of
one STS-79 Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) has heightened concern for the overall
integrity of Space Shuttle processing quality assurance procedures.
Recommendation #4
NASA, in concert with the several Space Shuttle contractors, should conduct an in-
depth review of Space Shuttle processing quality assurance procedures focused on
creating a more formal, documented approach to accounting for tools and other
material introduced to and removed from flight hardware work areas.
NASA Response to Recommendation #4
The Space Shuttle program element contractors presented their tool control pro-
grams to the Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) meeting in
December 1996. The SSRP reviewed the tool control programs of all the contractors
and determined that each of the tool programs was effective for the type of work per-
formed. The SSRP recommended that tool accounting audits be maintained or
increased, and that metrics be maintained to assure that each tool control program
remains effective. In a letter dated March 20, 1997, the Space Shuttle Systems
Integration Office confirmed that NSTS 07700, "Space Shuttle Program Definition
and Requirements," requires tool control for only the launch and landing project,
and recommended that Volume XI of NSTS 0770 be expanded to include tool con-
trol at the manufacturing facilities. A change request to NSTS 07700, Volume XI,
adding the program requirement to include tool control at the element manufactur-
ing facilities, was approved by the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) on
July 10, 1997.
Finding #5
NASA plans to operate the Space Shuttle until at least 2012. This will require safety
and operational upgrades to hardware, software, and logistics support.
Recommendation #5
NASA should complete Space Shuttle upgrades as soon as possible to take advantage
of opportunities for earliest risk reduction and operational improvement.
NASA Response to Recommendation #5
The SSP upgrade strategy is founded on the premise that safety, reliability, and sup-
portability improvements must be made to support human space transportation until
a suitable replacement is available. To manage and focus these efforts more effec-
tively, the SSP established the Office of SSP Development on January 16, 1997.
The Space Shuttle upgrades program is being implemented from a systems perspec-
tive. Upgrades will be integrated and prioritized across all flight and ground systems,
ensuring that individual upgrades are compatible and that their impact is assessed
across the entire program.
A phased approach to the SSP upgrades is already under way. Phase I, to be com-
pleted by the year 2000, emphasizes safety and performance enhancements for the
International Space Station (ISS) assembly and utilization. Ongoing efforts within
all SSP elements are also under way to identify Phase II candidate and Phase Ill/IV
studies. Primary emphasis remains on safety and risk reduction by improving reliabil-
ity and maintainability, eliminating obsolescent components, and improving vehicle
performance. As those upgrade candidates are identified by the program elements,
the SSP is committed to expediting implementation to maximize safety and reduce
overall program risk.
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ORBITER
Finding #6
The orbiter Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster valves continue to leak in
flight. NASA has aggressively attacked this problem with some success. Procedural
changes have improved thruster reliability, and the incidence of leakage has been
reduced but not eliminated.
Recommendation #6
Continued attention must be focused on the elimination of the root causes of RCS
valve leakage/failures.
NASA Response to Recommendation #6
Several remedial actions have been and are being implemented as a result of a 1995
tiger team investigation into the causes of RCS valve leakage/failure. This has
resulted in many procedural changes and several potential hardware improvement
concepts. The procedural changes are reducing the number of in-flight thruster valve
failures. Many of the hardware improvements are entering a development testing
phase. Examples of procedure and hardware changes include:
• Preventative maintenance flushing. Water flushing of the RCS pilot operated
valves (POV) was developed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) and has
been verified to remove iron nitrate contamination from the POV.
• Manifold thruster preventative change-outs. It is now required to change all
thrusters on a manifold when that manifold is drained fi)r any reason. The
removed thrusters are sent to WSTF for water flushing and then returned to
spares.
• Hard-filled manifi)ld processing. The POV has demonstrated substantially better
sealing capability in a fully wetted, hard-filled condition. KSC procedures have
been imp[emented that provide the ability to maintain a hard-filled manifold
configuration when performing work on the RCS pods.
• Nlinimization of moisture intrusion. Several additional recommendations have
been unplcmented that specifically address minimizing moisture intrusion into
the propellant system.
• Redesigned POV (RPOV). Another result of the critical examination of the RCS
POV failure history was the recommendation that the oxidizer POV be redesigned
to improve the ability to withstand nitrate contamination. The resulting RPOV
is proceeding through buildup and development testing. The RPOV design
addresses the areas in the current valve that are known to be sensitive to nitrate
contamination.
• Minimization of oxidizer moisture and iron content. The presence of iron and water
in nitrogen tetroxide greatly increases the potential for precipitation of iron nitrate
internaltothePOVpilotcavity.Therefore,amolecularsieveisbeingdesignedand
fabricatedtoreducethelevelsofironandwaterin nitrogentetroxide.
Finding #7
A new gas generator valve module for the hnproved Auxiliary Power Unit (IAPU)
is currently entering the process of certification. When fully certified, the IAPU with
this new valve is planned to be qualified for 75 hours of operation between scheduled
teardowns and overhauls (in excess of 10 years at projected use rates).
Recommendation #7
Once certification is achieved for 75 hours of IAPU operation, NASA should estab-
lish a periodic inspection and test program to assure that IAPUs continue to perform
in accordance with requirements throughout their service life.
NASA Response to Recommendation #7
An IAPU maintenance plan is being developed by the NASA and contractor tech-
nical community. Current activity is focused on developing a maintenance
specification, evaluating long-term life of elastomeric components, and organizing a
parts tracking/usage database. At the conclusion of this effort in late FY 1997, a long-
term maintenance plan will be baselined for implementation. Supplementing this to
provide long-term service life information is a fleet leader test program at WSTE The
WSTF program is currently scheduled to conclude in FY 1999 and is to demonstrate
75-hour run time and evaluate 10+ year teardown and overhaul time.
Finding #8
The Space Shuttle is about to receive two major avionics upgrades--a triple redun-
dant Global Positioning System (GPS) installation and the Multi-Function
Electronic Display System (MEDS)--both of which require significant changes to
the Primary Flight Software (PFS) and Backup Flight Software (BFS) systems.
Recommendation #8
The Space Shuttle program should ensure that both the GPS and bIEDS software
changes are thoroughly tested in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL)
using the normal and enhanced test protocols that have proved to be robust when
testing major modifications.
NASA Response to Recommendation #8
The SSP concurs that all software and hardware changes need thorough testing, and
it recognizes the extremely important role that SAIL testing fulfills in the comple-
ment of testing for software certification. All Shuttle software or hardware upgrades
are assessed to determine integrated verification test requirements. The SSP and its
contractors cooperate to produce integrated hardware and software test implemen-
tation plans, test requirements documents, and integrated test schedules to assure
that the required resources, including SAIL, are available. All these plans are
reviewed and approved by the program. Thorough testing of each new capability is
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ware Operational Increment (01) updates will be applied to the MEDS, GPS, other
Shuttle upgrades, and future software updates.
Finding #9
The Multi-Function Electronic Display System (MEDS) in the orbiter is being
implemented with display functions and formats that mimic the present electro-
mechanical and cathode ray tube presentations. There are significant potential safety
and operational benefits from enhancing the amount, type, and format of informa-
tion shown on the MEDS displays.
Recommendation #9
The Space Shuttle program should commit to a significantly enhanced MEDS dis-
play as soon as possible. The MEDS advanced display working group or a similar
multidisciplinary team should be tasked with identifying specific modifications and
an associated timetable so that the opportunities inherent in MEDS can be realized.
NASA Response to Recommendation #9
The SSP has established an enhanced MEDS program that includes hardware and
software enhancements to take full advantage of MEDS capabilities. This includes
hardware expansion as well as utilization of inherent MEDS capabilities to provide
better displays and improve crew situational awareness. Additionally, an SSP
Cockpit Upgrade Team is being formed to develop advanced display and application
concepts for future implementation into MEDS/enhanced MEDS/future avionics
upgrades capability. The Cockpit Upgrade Team will also participate in avionics
upgrades discussions in order to anticipate future hardware and software changes and
develop advanced cockpit applications to further improve crew awareness and reduce
crew training requirements. Initial testing of new applications for enhanced MEDS
will begin in June 1997.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
Finding # 10
The Block II SSME development program has proceeded well, except for the
Alternate Turbopump Program High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (ATP HPFTP). The
HPFTP has suffered significant failures in testing, which were traced to shortcomings
in hardware design details. Corrective actions have been implemented on the
HPFTP. Block II engine testing has resumed for this major safety improvement.
Recommendation #10
Continue the development and certification test programs as originally planned.
Accumulate the specified test operating times for the modified ATP HPFTP, and
employ the number of test pumps as per the original test plan.
NASA Response to Recommendation #I0
The SSME project is committed to meet the original development and certification
plan requirements. The schedule for certification has been adjusted to accommodate
comprehensive resolution of the development problems. Scheduled completion of
certification testing is now February 1998. As originally planned, the total "hot-fire
time" for development and certification will exceed 60,000 seconds, utilizing eight
HPFTP units. Certification will be based on two units with 22 tests each, and "hot-
fire time" of 11,000 seconds per pump or 22,000 seconds total certification time.
Finding # 11
The schedule for the first flight of the Block II engine has slipped, from September
1997 to December 1997. This schedule is optimistic and contains no slack for future
development problems. The schedule also requires continued availability of three
test stands at the Stennis Space Center (SSC).
Recommendation #11
Maintain the full scope of the planned test programs. Assure the availability of test
stand A-2 at SSC for as long as it is needed for the Block II engine test programs so
that three test stands continue to be available.
NASA Response to Recommendation #11
The development and certification test programs will be maintained as originally
planned. Test stand availability has been coordinated with other program test
requirements to support completion of Block II HPFTP certification testing in
February 1998. Three test stands are required only until July 1997 to support this
schedule. A mid-May milestone to initiate construction authorization for the July
reconfiguration of Test Stand A-1 for X-33 testing will be reassessed based on fuel
pump development status at that time. The other two test stands will remain dedi-
cated to SSME testing. After test stand modification, conversion back to SSME test
configuration would take approximately 1 month. The first flight of the Block II con-
figuration has been reassigned to STS-91, currently scheduled for May 1998.
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Due to the development problems with the ATP HPFTP and the associated schedule
slips, the SSP has elected to certify an interim Block II configuration, designated
Block IIA. Block IIA will consist of Rocketdyne's current HPFTP in conjunction
with the other Block II components and will provide the safety and reliability
benefits of the large throat main combustion chamber at the earliest opportunity.
This configuration will be certified to fly nominal missions at 104% to 104.5% rated
power level (RPL) and will maintain the current 109% RPL contingency abort
capability.
Finding #12
The Block 11 engine will be certified for operation at 109% power level only for abort
situations. Accordingly, the test program provides only limited cumulative test time
at this thrust level.
Recommendation #12
After completion of the current planned Block I1 certification test program, conduct
a certification extension test program that will demonstrate the highest thrust level
for safe continuous operation achievable by the Block II configuration. This program
should attempt to achieve at least the 109% power level.
NASA Response to Recommendation #12
The Block II program was developed to "improve the safety, reliability, and robust-
ness of the SSME" by providing lower operating temperatures, pressures, shaft speeds,
and other critical parameters. An increase in operating power level from 104% to
104.5% will offset some of the weight gain of Block If. The Block II SSME was never
intended to increase Space Shuttle ascent performance or increase payload capabil-
_ty to orbit. However, additional performance has been accepted for a few specific
missions at the cost of some of the improved safety margin. There is a commitment
that the ISS flights will provide 106% engine power level certification to achieve
mandatory critical payloads to orbit. The Block II certification will also provide a
109% intact abort capability, which will allow the vehicle system to better optimize
abort scenarios, hnplementation recommendations for use of 109% throttle for intact
aborts will be made by the Shuttle operations element once certification is complete.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR (RSRM)
Finding #13
Changes in the Pressure Sensitive Adhesive (PSA) and the cleaning agent for the
J-flap of the RSRM were driven by environmental regulations. The certification
testing for these changes included a Flight Support Motor (FSM) firing without the
application of side loads, a significant condition for RSRM field joints for which the
J-flap plays a role.
Recommendation #13
Employ the application of side loads in all future RSRM FSM firings.
NASA Response to Recommendation #13
The SSP and RSRM project agree with this recommendation when aft field joint test
objectives warrant inclusion on an FSM test motor. During Space Shuttle return-to-
flight RSRM redesign, the assessment of strut loading on the solid rocket motors
concluded that the only influence was at the aft field joint. The influence on the aft
field joint gap openings was predicted to be less than 0.001 inch, roughly an order of
magnitude less than the contribution of the internal motor pressures. Side loads were
included on two RSRM static test motors (QM-7 and -8) in a comprehensive effort
to include every element of flight loading influencing the aft field joint gap openings.
Joint gap openings were not measured directly, but the sealing systems performed as
expected. Gap openings were measured on the RSRM structural test article-3, where
testing showed side loads influence to be less than 0.0005 inch out of a total of
0.0084 inch for aft field joints only.
The consideration to include side loads on all future tests would not come without
technical penalty. To accommodate the side load forces, the aft test stand must be
locked out, and as such, no thrust measurements are obtained. Also, no thrust vector
control (TVC) duty cycling is performed during the side load events, which requires
modification to the baseline static test duty cycle; for certain test objectives, this is
an important requirement consideration. This baseline TVC duty cycle is utilized to
allow direct performance comparisons between static tests, primarily associated with
nozzle and aft dome materials or components. Therefore, a generic inclusion of side
loads on all future FSM tests would require elimination of other test considerations,
which, depending on specific test objectives, might be a qualification necessity.
In conclusion, the RSRM static test policy includes side loads on full-scale static test
motors where there are test objectives associated with the aft field joints, which
could be influenced by side loads.
Finding #14
There are many material and process changes in work for the RSRM in response to
both environmental regulations and obsolescence issues. A vital part of the certifi-
cation program for these changes is the demonstration of the acceptability of the
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changes during an FSM firing. At present, FSM firings are scheduled at 2-year inter-
vals instead of the 1-year or 18-month intervals previously used.
Recommendation #14
Considering the large number of changes in RSRM materials and processes and the
importance of proper simulation of operating conditions in any certification test pro-
gram, NASA should reevaluate its decision to have 2 years between FSM firings.
NASA Response to Recommendation #14
The RSRM project presented an assessment of static test motor frequency to the
PRCB on February 27, 1997, and recommended static tests at 1-year intervals. The
recommendation was accepted by the PRCB. An initiative is under way to ensure
that the maximum possible benefit is obtained from each test.
Finding # 15
A substantial program effort is under way to eliminate the asbestos used in RSRM
manufacture and replace it with more environmentally acceptable (i.e., "asbestos-
free") materials. Although some of the materials tested to date meet specifications,
they do not provide as high structural and thermal margins as the asbestos-contain-
ing materials.
Recommendation #15
To maintain flight safety, NASA should not eliminate the use of asbestos in RSRM
manufacture. An environmental waiver should be obtained to continue its use in
RSRM insulation, liners, inhibitors, and other motor parts in the event of future reg-
ulatory threat to the asbestos supplier.
NASA Response to Recommendation #15
NASA currently has no plan to introduce nonasbestos-based replacements for
asbestos-based components in RSRM production. The RSRM production and flight
history are baselined with asbestos-based materials, primarily NBR rubber. Asbestos
is also a constituent of liner and adhesives. The production, handling, and disposal
processes for these materials are performed in compliance with strict state, Federal,
and local controls and regulations regarding asbestos material. There are no currently
identified regulations to ban production or use of asbestos materials in the RSRM
supply chain. Because there is no existing or pending regulation, pursuit of waivers or
exemptions is not applicable at this time.
NASA considers it prudent to continue low-level development of possible alterna-
tive nonasbestos materials. This reflects NASA's sensitivity to the environment,
worker safety and health issues, and the fact that the shelf life of these materials pre-
cludes the option to stockpile. This development effort is being carried out to provide
limited contingency development at a routine pace. The recommendations by both
the ASAP and the RSRM initiatives to find alternative materials are consistent with
program policy documented in SSP letter MS 96-071, dated September 16, 1996.
The policy seeks to balance flight safety and environmental protection goals.
EXTERNAL TANK (ET)
Finding # 16
The 2195 alulninum-lithium alloy used in the tank walls and domes of the new Super
Light Weight Tank (SLWT) has a lower fracture toughness at cryogenic temperatures
than was anticipated in the design. To compensate for this potentially critical short-
coining, NASA has limited the pressure used in the full tank proof test and has
recognized that acceptance of each SLWT for flight is highly dependent on far more
stringent quality control of the materials and processes used to manufacture the
SLWT than is required for the current external tanks.
Recommendation #16a
Assure that the acceptance tests of the 2195 material and the quality control proce-
dures used in the manufacture of each SLWT continue to be sufficiently stringent,
clearly specified, conscientiously adhered to, and their use unambiguously documented.
NASA Response to Recommendation #16a
The SSP and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will continue to ensure that
material acceptance testing and the quality control procedures used in the manufac-
turing of SLWT's are of a sufficient quality to validate that each tank is fully in
compliance with all program requirements and is safe to fly.
Recommendation #16b
The criticality of these quality control operations makes it mandatory for NASA to
retain buyoff of the results of those fabrication operations and tests that are essential
in determining SLWT safety.
NASA Response to Recommendation #16b
The SSP and MSFC will retain NASA approval of the quality control program and
changes to that baseline.
Recommendation #16c
As quality control data on the size of flaws detected in 2195 aluminum-lithium mate-
rial are collected, they should be used in an updated analysis of the SLWT structure,
because it may permit the verifiable spread between flight limit stress and proof stress
to be raised above that presently reported.
NASA Response to Recommendation #16c
The simulated service database has been developed from data collected on fracture
specimens with flaws that are 0.175 inch long. The data verify a 2.9% positive spread
between the flight and proof-test conditions. Using the demonstrated flaw
detectability level for our nondestructive evaluation dye penetrant process (0.086
inch long) would increase the spread to approximately 14%. Because of uncertain-
ties, it is NASA's standard policy to use a factor of two on our flaw detectability limit.
This methodology provides the proper risk allocation between the nondestructive
evaluation capability and proof-test levels. The use of a flaw size of 0.175 inch for the
simulated service tests is conservative for the SLWT.
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LOGISTICS
Finding #17
Transition of logistics functions under Phase 1 of the Space Flight Operations
Contract (SFOC) appears to be taking place smoothly. Key personnel are maintain-
ing continuity in management techniques and processes.
Recommendation #17
Continue adherence to established systems, and make maximum use of the inherent
capability of the incumbent personnel in the logistics systems.
NASA Response to Recommendation #17
NASA concurs. The established NASA Logistics Operations continues to monitor
the established logistics systems and enhance others in order to maintain insight into
the logistics activity. Both the SFOC contractor and NASA Logistics Organization
have retained incumbent key personnel with critical logistics skills to minimize the
transitional risks and continue to support the SSE
Currently, the SFOC contractor is studying the horizontal consolidation of like func-
tions and processes. NASA Logistics Operations will monitor the contractor's
progress to assure that the logistics systems resulting from this consolidation will be
capable, effective, efficient, and, above all, not adversely impacting the safety of
operations.
Finding # 18
Long-term projections suggest increasing cannibalization rates, component repair
turnaround times, and loss of repair capability for the Space Shuttle logistics and sup-
port programs.
Recommendation #18
Take early remedial action to control this potential situation, such as maintaining
sufficient spares and extending repair and overhaul capability.
NASA Response to Recommendation #18
NASA is closely monitoring logistics trends. The areas of emphasis stress long-term
logistics support indicators, specifically backlog and repair turnaround. While an
increase in repair turnaround time has been noted, vehicle support remains at the
same high level. Budget reductions in past years have meant that fewer spares have
been produced and less repairs were performed, but NASA and the contractor will
continue to manage the process to maintain acceptable levels of support. Presently,
logistics performance measurement data do not indicate any adverse trends in can-
nibalization rates.
NASA has directed SFOC management to maintain an emphasis on logistics sup-
portability during the transition of all contract responsibilities. The SFOC
contractor has been directed to maintain key personnel with critical logistics skills to
minimize transitional risks and provide continuity to Shuttle logistics support. In
addition, SFOC is required to develop and submit original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) contingency plans for responding to known and potential support issues at
effected OEMs. All known supportability threats are tracked and evaluated to deter-
mine the associated risk and required actions for resolution. The SFOC has the
appropriate processes in place to both monitor and respond to loss of subcontractor
capability. The NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) has been certified to make
some repairs where there has been a loss of critical supplier capability. The SFOC is
also considering consolidating similar work at one vendor so that the NSLD is not
the only repair agent.
Finding # 19
Obsolescence of components and systems on the Space Shuttle is an increasing prob-
lem threatening critical spares availability.
Recommendation #19
Alternative components must be developed and certified, and, where necessary, sys-
tems must be redesigned to use available or adaptable units.
NASA Response to Recommendation #19
NASA continues to identify and coordinate obsolescence issues concerning hard-
ware, special test equipment, vendor capability, and environmental restrictions with
the appropriate design center. Each issue is evaluated for logistics impacts, and this
information is communicated to or within the design center so that appropriate
action can be taken to initiate any required redesigns, modifications, or enhance-
ments. A Kennedy Space Center (KSC) logistics priority list is maintained to
communicate logistics' top concerns to design center management. While obsoles-
cence will continue, a team approach to problem identification, prioritization, and
resolution appears to be providing effective problem resolution. Additionally, the
Shuttle upgrade program is designed to assure that potential problem areas are
addressed so as to preclude disruption in meeting manifest requirements.
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B, INTERNATIONALSPACESTATION(ISS)
Finding #20
The schedules for ISS buildup are tight, and there is little, if any, schedule slack to
accommodate late or unavailable hardware. Schedule and/or budget pressures could
lead to deferring work to orbit or curtailing prelaunch testing.
Recommendation #20
ISS program plans for finishing and testing hardware before launch should not be
compromised to meet either launch schedules or budgets.
NASA Response to Recommendation #20
NASA concurs. Integration testing is in the approved program's current baseline.
Prelaunch integrated testing at KSC is based on the degree to which this testing
abates program risk, weighed against the hardware damage risk and the cost and
schedule impacts. The content for component, subassembly, and element-level test-
ing is the minimum requirement for specification compliance verification. A
program-approved change would be required to eliminate this work. In fact, integra-
tion and testing are being strengthened as opportunities develop. A proposal to
conduct multi-element integration testing is being planned, which would exploit the
unique KSC ground processing expertise. This would involve actual flight hardware
to conduct end-to-end testing for assembly elements 3A, 4A, 5A, and 6A in the
manner that these elements would be assembled on-orbit.
ISS program requirements for on-orbit stage and assembly-complete capability reflect
a thoroughly reviewed baseline. This baseline generally reflects a minimum required
capability, which has incorporated improvements to satisfy an achievable crew work-
load. There is strong inherent resistance in the program, therefore, to bringing
incomplete hardware to be processed at KSC, much less than to orbit, because of the
minimum capability constraints and crew workload impacts.
Finding #21
The overall design philosophy for meteoroid and orbital debris (M/OD) mitigation
has been agreed to, in principle, by the international partners. Much of the U.S.
module shielding design is nearing completion. Nevertheless, there remains a finite
probability that a penetrating collision will occur during the life of the ISS mission.
The emphasis of the M/OD effort is therefore shifting to operations issues, such as
caution and warning, damage control, and strategies for reaction to depressurization
events.
Recommendation #21
Agreement with the international partners should be completed. Operational strate-
gies and procedures for handling M/OD events should be developed and incorporated
into ISS plans and schedules. Crew training programs to accommodate these strate-
gies and procedures should be established.
NASAResponse to Recommendation #21
The Common Depressurization Strategy (CDS) team was formed in May 1995 to
coordinate the program approach for responding to a potential depressurization
event. The team's charter is to address crew and vehicle operational strategies, imme-
diately identify required hardware modifications to make safe the vehicle and crew,
and develop necessary plans for implementation of these items. Baseline crew proce-
dures, repair requirements, assessment methodologies, and identified hardware
modifications (to reduce risks of vehicle and crew loss in the event of a penetration)
are documented in international protocol agreements. Plans for implementation are
being developed. This approach has been independently reviewed and validated in a
series of joint meetings led by Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford (USAF, Ret.) of the
NASA Advisory Council and Academician Vladimir F. Utkin of the Russia Space
Agency Advisory Expert Council. Specific activities have been agreed to and will be
completed by December 1997.
Finding #22
The collision avoidance and maneuver process for evading meteoroids and orbital
debris is complicated and not yet completely worked out for many of the scenarios
likely to occur during the life of the 1SS program.
Recommendation #22
The collision avoidance and maneuver process must be worked out in detail and doc-
umented in interagency memoranda and in agreements among the international
partners.
NASA Response to Recommendation #22
NASA has a history of cooperation with the U.S. Air Force Space Command
(USSPACECOM). Several Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) are in place with
USSPACECOM for Shuttle collision avoidance procedures. The requirements for
the ISS are being worked through an established working group. A Debris Avoidance
Operations Plan was drafted in 1996. Required international participation is being
and has been worked through hardware specifications, international protocol agree-
ments, and the Station Program Implementation Plan. A Flight Mechanics Working
Group has been chartered, which includes Russian and NASA participation. This
group meets regularly, and their results are documented in the ISSP Flight Rules
Manual.
Finding #23
Design of the Caution and Warning (C&W) system had been lagging behind that of
other ISS systems. Priority has now been given to the system engineering effort that
is required to resolve conflicting operational concepts and to finalize the design.
Recommendation #23
Continue to apply high-level system engineering attention to the expeditious reso-
lution of C&W design philosophies and implementations.
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NASA Response to Recommendation #23
NASA concurs. The ISS Caution and Warning (C&W) system has matured
throughout 1996, with improvements in tone commonality, event definition,
Personal Computer System (PCS) display development, application code generation,
and recognition by all program elements. The C&W System Integration Team's
(CWSIT) primary purpose is to ensure that the C&W system is safe, robust, and inte-
grated throughout the vehicle and throughout the lifetime of the program. The
team's primary responsibilities include:
• Providing end-to-end C&W design integration, including display and response
concept definition
• Developing and leading a forum for resolution of C&W design/operational issues
Attachment 1 provides specific responses based on the current design for the exam-
ples cited in Section III: Information in Support of Findings and Recommendations,
ASAP Annual Report, February 1997.
In addition, in response to the ASAP concerns, the International Space Station
Program Office (ISSPO) has tasked two independent assessments of caution and
warning activities. These efforts are led by the Manager, ISS Independent
Assessment, and the ISS Chief Engineer. These assessments were completed in
August 1997.
Finding #24
The ISS has no requirement for sensing a toxic substance spill within a payload rack.
The ISS does require that toxic substances in payload racks be multiply contained.
Recommendation #24
The ISS should require payload providers to include, as part of their system design,
detection and annunciation of any toxics they carry or could generate.
NASA Response to Recommendation #24
NASA concurs. The approach for payloads on the ISS is patterned after the Shuttle
approach. The payload design requirements are defined in NSTS 1700.7B, "Safety
Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Transportation System," and
the ISS Addendum, which to date make the possibility of having a toxic spill so
remote as to be an acceptable risk. Requirements imposed on payloads include con-
tainment levels stipulated based on level of toxicity of the substance or use of an
approved pressure vessel.
The payload provider is required to obtain approval by the Payload Safety Review
Panel (PSRP) for the use of any toxic substance, as well as the containment method
utilized. Through the safety process defined in NSTS 13830, "Implementation
Procedure for STS Payloads System Safety Requirements," all potentially toxic sub-
stances are labeled and documented in crew procedures, along with any cleanup
instructions.Thisensuresthat neededinformationon anypotentiallytoxicsub-
stanceis readilyavailableto the crew.This conceptfor the handlingof toxic
substancesi basedon ShuttleandMir programexperienceandhasnot been
changed.
WhenpayloadsarereviewedbythePSRP,compliancewiththeaboverequirements
mustbedemonstrated.Astronauttrainingandproceduresarereviewedandapproved
to ensurethatthecrewisadequatelyeducatedto avoidinadvertentlymixingtoxic
chemicals.In addition,thepayloadesignmuststillbeabletotoleratetheappropri-
atenumberof operatorerrors.
Theserequirementsdonot imposedesignsolutionsonpayloads;rather,theyrequire
thepayloadprovidersto proactivelyconsidertheir owndesignsolutionsto avoid
toxicmixing.Enforcingtheserequirementsin thePSRPprocessbyensuringcompli-
ancewith therequirementsof NSTS1700.7Bwill restrictthepossibilityfor toxic
mixingto anacceptablerisk.Dependentonacase-by-caseanalysis,thePSRPorthe
payloadprovidermayrequestdetectionandmonitoring.Thedetectionwill thenbe
providedbythepayloadproviderorganizationwith tie-into theISScoresystemsof
C&W (annunciation)providedbycoresysteminterfacesattheracklevel.Thisser-
vicewill thenbedefinedin theappropriateInterfaceDefinitionDocument(IDD).
Thecrewwill beusedtoenunciateanytoxicspillsthroughouttheISS.Thisiscon-
sideredessentiallytheequivalentofthepanicalarm.Thecrewwill alsobeusedto
detectanytoxicspill.Studieshaveshownthatintermoduleventilationwill spread
anytoxicgasesto allelementsof theISSwithin20minutes,whichmakestation-
leveldetection otpractical.
This further illustratesthe importanceof havingadequatedesignrequirements
imposedonpayloadstoprecludetoxicspills.Crewannunciationanddetectionhave
beenconsideredacceptablebecauseofthedesignrequirementsimposedonthepay-
loadsto maintainappropriatel velsof containment.However,shoulda toxicspill
occur,provisionsareavailableto payloadsforcleanup.Theseincludeacrewconta-
minationprotectionkit (goggles,chemicalresistantbags,chemicalresistantgloves,
emergencye ewash),aportablebreathingapparatus,acombustionproductsanalyzer,
avolatileorganicsanalyzer,multipleairbornetracecontaminantcontrolequipment,
vacuumaccess,and moduledepressurization.The JSC MissionOperations
Directorateiscurrentlydevelopingprocedurestorespondtoatoxicspill.Theproce-
dureswill bebasedonShuttleexperience.Theresponsewill dependonthehazard
levelof thesubstance,thestateof thesubstance(liquid,gas,orsolid),thelocation
of thespill,andthesizeof thespill.
Finding #25
The ISS design does not include a requirement for a wireless communication system
to maintain crew contact throughout the station. The present design requires a crew
member to translate to a panel or connect a headset.
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The ISS program should establish a requirement for "hands-free" communications
with crew members to deal with situations such as injuries or meteorite/debris
impacts in which it may be necessary to establish rapid contact.
NASA Response to Recommendation #25
The requirements specification for this capability has been developed and is provided
in Attachment 2. The Station Wireless Communications Subsystem (SWCS) will be
installed on orbit no earlier than assembly flight 6a.
Finding #26
The X-38 research vehicle program is a good approach for developing an ISS Crew
Return Vehicle (CRV).
Recommendation #26
Any CRV resulting from the X-38 program should be capable of fulfilling the design
reference missions that were developed by the Space Station Freedom program for an
assured CRV.
NASA Response to Recommendation #26
The ISS program and the X-38 project are developing a top-level set of requirements
and dependencies between the ISS and the CRV derived from the X-38. This docu-
ment, the Performance and Support Requirements Document (PSRD), specifies the
three basic CRV design reference missions (return of an injured or ill crew person,
emergency evacuation of the station, and return of crew in case the ISS cannot be
resupplied) as defined in the top-level Station Specification, SSP 41000. These three
design reference missions are the same as used for the ACRV during the Space
Station Freedom program.
C, COMPUTERHARDWARE/SOFTWARE
Finding #27
NASA's Agencywide software safety policy allows projects latitude to tailor their
software safety plan for safety-critical software. It does not, however, require projects
to obtain center Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) approval of the tailored
software safety plans nor does it require Verification and Validation (V&V) per se.
While the software assurance standard does mention V&V, it does not require any
independence of V&V for safety-critical software.
Recommendation #27a
NASA should require approval of a project's tailored software safety plan by both the
center S&MA organization and by one administrative level higher than that making
the request.
NASA Response to Recommendation #2 7a
NASA agrees with the intent of this recommendation but believes the requirements
for formal system safety program plans and software management plans exist and,
with proper and firm enforcement, fulfill the objective of this recommendation. To
be sure that these requirements are perfectly understood, the Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance (©SMA) will update NSS 1740.13, "NASA Software Safety
Standard," to explicitly state that the program/project manager for programs/projects
perform an assessment to determine, based on the level of criticality and risk, the
scope and level of Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) to be planned.
The results of the assessment will be formally reviewed by Center Safety and Mission
Assurance (SMA). The program/project manager, in consultation with SMA, will
tailor an approach to ensure that the appropriate V&V requirements are established
and implemented. The OSMA will place more emphasis on the implementation and
enforcement of these existing requirements. Process verification, recently established
in the OSMA, will be used to evaluate and enforce these existing policy and require-
ments more aggressively.
NASA is committed to assuring that required program management plans and any
subordinate plans such as software or safety management plans cover the essential
requirements for programs where warranted by cost, size, complexity, lifespan, risk,
and consequence of failure. Additional changes are being incorporated into NPG
7120.5, "NASA Program/Project Management Guide" (currently under develop-
ment), to ensure that necessary and sufficient requirements will be fulfilled for
programs having software vulnerabilities. SMA organizations at each level are to be
a party to these decisions and are to intervene where necessary to assure that proper
and clearly documented decisions are made by the appropriate level of management.
The Program Management Councils could play a role in adjudicating any issues with
the content of program management plans.
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Recommendation #27b
NASA's software safety plan should require formal V&V of safety-critical software.
Testing alone does not suffice.
NASA Response to Recommendation #27b
NASA agrees with the intent of this recommendation and is confident that NPD
2820, "NASA Software Policies" (currently under development), will ensure that
software management and/or safety plans developed for any NASA program/project
will specify the level of V&V and types of testing that should be implemented. NPD
2820 policy relating to software V&V states that NASA will create and/or acquire
and maintain software through risk-based management. Risk management products
shall be documented or referenced in a management plan. NASA will employ V&V,
IV&V, and other trusted verification techniques for appropriate risk mitigation based
on the cost, size, complexity, lifespan, risk, and consequence of failure. NSS 1740.13
is not a NASA Software Safety Plan. The level of detailed requirements that the
ASAP is recommending be in NSS 1740.13 more appropriately belongs in the doc-
uments that the programs and projects will prepare in response to NSS 1740.13.
These details need to be documented in the Software Management Plan (SMP), the
System Safety Program Plan (SSPP), or the Program Management Plan (PMP).
NASA maintains that the requirement stated in NASA-STD.2100-91, "Software
Documentation Standard," suffices as a requirement for addressing the issue of V&V
for programs.
NHB 1700.1, "NASA Safety Policy and Requirements Document," requires NASA
program managers to publish and maintain an approved NASA Safety Management
Plan (SMP). The program manager is responsible for approval of the NASA SMP
and contractor Safety Program Plan (SPP). The system safety manager (SSM),
assigned by the program manager (PM) from the Center Safety and Mission
Assurance organization, prepares the SMP. The SSM, reviews the contractor's SPP
and provides recommendations to the PM. The SSM, upon review of the contractor's
SPP, will have the required insight into the approach for software V&V to ensure
that a proper balance of analyses, inspections, and testing is planned for the entire
life cycle of the program. NASA's SMA organizations at the NASA Centers are cur-
rently involved in the review of V&V plans for software and do make
recommendations to the PM.
Recommendation #27c
NASA should develop an explicit policy that requires independent V&V for safety-
critical software.
NASA Response to Recommendation #27c
NASA agrees with the premise that safety-critical software is a prime candidate for
IV&V; however, it is NASA's position that all software determined to be safety-
critical by engineering or safety analyses need not be subjected to lV&V. To be sure
that program/project managers plan for the proper level of both V&V and IV&V
fromthe outset,theOSMAwill updateNSS1740.13,"NASA SoftwareSafety
Standard,"to explicitlystatethat program/projectmanagersperformanassess-
mentto determinethescopeandlevelof IV&V basedon thelevelof criticality
andrisk.Theresultsof theassessmentwill beformallyreviewedbySMA.This
way,the program/projectmanager,in consultationwith SMA,will tailor an
approachto ensurethat the appropriate V&V requirements are established and
implemented. NPD 2820 has incorporated the proper approach for software on
NASA programs/projects; the directive requires program managers to employ
IV&V, V&V, and other proven verification techniques for risk mitigation, based
on cost, complexity, risk, and consequence of failure. NPG 7120.5, "NASA
Program/Project Management Guide" (currently under development), will reflect
some of the requirements now found in documents that program managers may not
normally review for compliance.
Finding #28
NASA has put considerable effort into the reorganization of its software activities
and has made significant progress. It does not yet, however, have a comprehensive,
clear set of roles and responsibilities for various groups within the Agency with
respect to software development, safety, V&V, and software process development.
Recommendation #28
NASA should ensure that there is a clear, universally well-understood, widely pro-
mulgated, and enforced NASA Policy Directive on the roles and responsibilities of
its various organizations vis&-vis software development and safety. Moreover, that
Policy Directive should specify organizational roles and responsibilities solely on the
basis of technical and administrative capability.
NASA Response to Recommendation #28
NASA agrees with the recommendation. The July 1996 (draft) program plan for the
Fairmont (IV&V) Facility is the contract between Code Q and the Facility and will
be updated for future funding and delegation of the software assurance program.
NASA concurs that the draft plan now contains ambiguities but will be clarified in
the next update.
The IV&V Facility's reporting structure will be finalized in the upcoming proposed
Ames Research Center reorganization. It is anticipated that the IV&V Facility will
be moved from under the direction of Code I at Ames and installed as the equivalent
of a Directorate in the new ARC organization.
The IV&V Facility Business Plan currently defines the roles and responsibilities of
the IV&V Facility. NASA Headquarters will establish and document at the policy
level the roles in the Agency for all software, including embedded and flight system
software. The policies document will explain how the roles and responsibilities of the
Agencywide software efforts mentioned in the finding (e.g., CIO, COE-IT, IV&V
Facility) fit together in a synergistic manner within the Agency.
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The new NPD 2820 will define Agency policy for program/project utilization of the
IV&V Facility. The Chief Information Officer, the Chief Engineer's Office, the
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and the Software Working Group will be
responsible for increasing Agency awareness of all the software-related resources,
policies, and existing standards. The newly implemented Code Q process verification
activity will validate Agency project managers' awareness of software assurance
policy and procedures for compliance in software development efforts.
Finding #29
The use of the Matrix X autocode generator for ISS software can lead to serious prob-
lems if the generated code and Matrix X itself are not subjected to effective
configuration control or the products are not subjected to unit-level V&V. These
problems can be exacerbated if the code generated by Matrix X is modified by hand.
Recommendation #29
NASA should ensure that thorough IV&V is conducted on all code produced by
Matrix X, including any hand-coded modifications made to it, and that there is ade-
quate configuration control on the code generated by Matrix X.
NASA Response to Recommendation #29
NASA agrees with the intent of the recommendation. IV&V will be performed on
programs in accordance with the approach explained in our response to item 27a
above. NASA is aware of the problems and concerns relating to Matrix X. Software
changes that are made after auto-code generation, configuration management diffi-
culties with hand-crafted changes after regeneration, code that appears different after
auto-generation because of new variable name assignments, and new releases of the
auto-coding tool itself are the principal areas of concern. These problems and con-
cerns are considered to be inherent to auto-code generation tools. The NASA IV&V
Facility in West Virginia will continue to evaluate the use of auto-code generators
and the Matrix X generator tool specifically in order to better characterize these con-
cerns and develop policies and procedures to better govern the use of auto-generated
code. Some potential users of Matrix X have already been working closely with the
NASA IV&V Facility on the issue of Matrix X and auto-code generation in general.
The IV&V Facility will review program plans for programs that plan to incorporate
an auto-generation tool and will assist in the development of guidelines to minimize
the risks.
Regarding the Product Group 1 (PG1) use of Matrix X for developing the ISS
Control and Data Handling software, NASA concurs with the concern over the con-
figuration change control and the verification of the auto-coded software. The
configuration control of all auto-coded software should be both at the model level
and at the source code level. The prime contractor will be receiving both the models
and the generated source and binary code from the PGs and will regenerate the
source and binary code to ensure completeness and accuracy of the delivery.
Product Group 1 had problems late last year with unit testing of the flight software
produced by Matrix X, but at that time they concluded that it was better to utilize a
more modular design. Coincident with this, Product Group 1 also used Matrix X to
build unit test drivers without impacting the unit under test. This procedure also
includes the capability to test the units on the target hardware. These changes alle-
viate the NASA IV&V Facility's original concerns with Matrix X and unit testing.
The prime contractor is currently negotiating the wording for the PG1 Software
Development Plan to implement these changes. The prime contractor has not yet
begun looking at the older Product Group 3 (PG3) Software Development Plan to
determine any additional changes needed. The NASA 1V&V Facility's analysis of
PGYs use of Matrix X did not generate any concerns. It should be noted that neither
Product Group 2 nor the prime contractor use Matrix X for coding their software.
Finding # 30
NASA does not have procedures in place for documenting the f, rmware that is
placed in ISS components, particularly for devices that were grandfathered from
Space Station Freedom.
Recommendation #30
NASA should ensure that all firmware code, particularly that grandfathered from
Space Station Freedom, is properly documented and archived for future reference.
Further, NASA should ensure that it retains the rights to such software.
NASA Response to Recommendation #30
NASA agrees with the recommendation. Direction to deliver copies of the docu-
mentation (requirement, design, test, etc.) of the firmware controller software
prepared as part of their software development process is being given to each
vendor. A library will be established in the Software Development and Integration
Laboratory (SDIL) at the Sonny Carter Training Facility. In addition, as part of the
sustaining engineering activity, a plan is being developed to bring the qualification
firmware controller units to the IV&V Facility and provide a capability to use these
controllers instead of math models when required to support anomaly resolution or
testing.
Finding # 31
There has been a marked improvement in the software development process for the
ISS.
Recommendation # 31
By no means have all problems been solved, and there is still much to be done.
Continue the focused efforts.
NASA Response to Recommendation #31
NASA agrees with the recommendation. A strong management focus on the soft-
ware development process for the ISS will continue. These include weekly status
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reports concerning the prime contractor and product group developments and strong
interaction at the design and test reviews. To ensure progress does not slip, the prime
contractor has initiated several activities, including additional shift work, new
hiring, and developer/tester teaming arrangements.
D. AERONAUTICS
Finding #32
The well-planned consolidation of NASA flight research aircraft at the Dryden
Flight Research Center has been put on hold by congressional mandates. This uncer-
tain situation has prompted low morale and caused the loss of good people, which
could well lead to flight safety problems.
Recommendation #32
The impasse between NASA intentions and congressional mandate must be resolved
as soon as possible.
NASA Response to Recommendation #32
NASA is continuing to work with both the Administration and Congress on the
consolidation of flight research aircraft. As always, safety of flight rernains the
"number one" priority in all our aircraft operations. We will cancel or postpone
missions if staffing attrition or other problems impact operations. Most recently,
the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance completed an assessment of aircraft
operations at the Ames Research Center, where they found "an extremely tal-
ented and dedicated group of professionals who are committed to mission success
and safety." Although staff has been declining, a number of aircraft have been
decommissioned, thereby allowing a smaller staff to continue effective and safe
operations.
Finding #33
The fan blades on the 40' x 80' x 120' wind tunnel at the Ames Research Center
developed cracks after only 2,000 hours of operation. To preclude shutting down the
tunnel for the 1 year required to procure and install a new set of blades, it was decided
to repair the old blades while waiting for delivery of the replacements. The repair
includes wrapping the root section of the blades, which eliminates the ability to
detect crack growth by visual inspection.
Recommendation #33
NASA should ensure that a suitable inspection program, including frequent checks
using nondestructive evaluation methods, is implemented.
NASA Response to Recommendation #33
As part of the fan blade repair at the National Full-Scale Aerodynamic Complex
(NFAC), quality assurance and inservice inspection procedures are being developed
and applied to ensure functionality of the repair. All blades are being visually exam-
ined to assess and establish their condition prior to the start of repair. Throughout
the repair process, both ultrasonic and acoustic tap testing is being performed to
determine adequacy of the crack fill, as well as the wrap lay-up quality and bonding.
After placing back in service, periodic inspections using acoustic tap testing and a
series of full-scale fatigue tests will be implemented to monitor and characterize void
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frequency and size of indications, will be developed.
Finding #34
NASA's aeronautics research programs aimed at increasing aviation safety are having
and will continue to have a significant positive impact on both military and civil
flight operations. Several of these were in cooperation with other Government agen-
cies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration.
Recommendation #34
NASA should continue to pursue aeronautics research programs, particularly joint
efforts with other agencies, that will increase the safety of air operations.
NASA Response to Recommendation #34
In direct support of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,
NASA has begun a major safety research initiative in partnership with the FAA,
DoD, the National Weather Service, and the aviation industry. NASA will invest up
to a half billion dollars over the next 5 years targeted at a strategic goal of reducing
aircraft accident rates fivefold within 10 years and tenfold within 20 years. This ini-
tiative will include research to reduce human-error-caused accidents and incidents,
predict and prevent mechanical and software malfunctions, and eliminate accidents
involving hazardous weather and controlled flight into terrain.
E.OTHER
Finding #35
The Space Shuttle program has experienced some difficulties when stable work
processes were altered to counter obsolescence or meet new environmental require-
ments. The simultaneous change in pressure sensitive adhesive and cleaning wipe in
the RSRMs to meet environmental regulations is one example.
Recommendation #35
The Space Shuttle program should not alter long-established and stable processes
without defining and completing an adequate test program. If changes in stable and
well-characterized safety-related hardware and processes are being driven by envi-
ronmental requirements, NASA should consider seeking waivers of these
requirements rather than altering a proven design.
NASA Response to Recommendation #35
The SSP has been and is committed to not altering long-established and stable
processes without defining and completing an adequate test program. The program
has long had requirements governing the recertification of hardware in the event of
either a hardware design change and/or a process change(s) that affect form, fit, func-
tion, safety, and/or reliability. However, the program has authorized a recent
requirement change (reference PRCB Directive S071024DL) to provide a program-
level review of all hardware and/or process changes whose certification is based solely
on analysis. This requirement change necessitates a program assessment of the ratio-
hale for specifically defined changes whose recertification is based solely on an
analysis, as opposed to those where the recertification is based on the performance of
an adequate test program. It is felt that compliance with this new requirement will
assure that changes to long-established and stable process changes are only imple-
mented with adequate and appropriate recertification.
For any safety-related hardware or process change that is being driven by environ-
mental requirements, NASA includes in its initial assessments the appropriateness of
seeking a waiver to the requirements that are causing the change. Where such an
assessment substantiates the appropriateness of a waiver, then that waiver shall be
sought. The SSP adopted a policy that balances flight safety and environmental pro-
tection goals in SSP letter MS-96-071, dated September 16, 1996. The SSP manager
specified: (1) obtain long-term waivers for materials essential to safe Space Shuttle
operations where functionality cannot be verified; (2) obtain long-term waivers for
materials where no replacements exist; and (3) continue to pursue identification and
certification of replacement materials.
Finding #36
While firefighting preparedness and training in NASA is generally adequate, further
reductions in staffing and funding may compromise the ability to perform this vital
safety function.
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Recommendation #36
Continue to review firefighting at all NASA Centers to ensure that funding, per-
sonnel, training, and adequacy of equipment are properly addressed.
NASA Response to Recommendation #36
NASA agrees with the assessment that fire protection for NASA facilities could
suffer if not properly managed by NASA.
In accordance with NMI 1240.3, "Functional Management," the Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance (OSMA) has performed functional reviews ("spot checks") at
each Center since March 1994. Each of these functional reviews had, as an element,
an evaluation of the fire protection program for the Center. In prior years, reviews
were conducted as part of a Center survey process, which also included fire protec-
tion. These reviews focused principally on whether firefighting preparedness and
training within NASA is at the appropriate level for performing this vital safety func-
tion.
Because of the recommendation made by the Panel, additional attention has been
focused on this concern within NASA over the last several months. During the
NASA Emergency Preparedness Coordinators meeting held at the Ames Research
Center, February 25-28, 1997, all coordinators were given an action to further pursue
this specific concern at their individual installations as a "high level of interest." At
the May 21-23, 1997, meeting for NASA Fire Protection Coordinators, held at the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, these coordinators provided a "status" briefing on the pos-
ture of their fire protection program in light of the stated concerns by the Panel.
All NASA Centers and Installations have reported that their fire protection and
response capability at this time remains adequate. However, it was a consensus that
diminished NASA budgets have fostered a concomitant shifting of each NASA
Center's reliance to the community's local fire protection and response capability
through memoranda of agreement. Because local community fire departments are
feeling the same pressure of downsizing that the Federal establishments are facing,
these departments are also reducing capabilities and increasing response times. The
OSMA, the Enterprise Institutional Program Officers (IPOs), and the Center Fire
Protection Coordinators will need to be increasingly vigilant that any shift of local
community fire department's response capability away from Federal facilities will not
increase the risk to NASA personnel or property to an unacceptable level.
The OSbIA will continue to focus attention on fire protection in our scheduled visits
to Centers and will keep the Enterprise AAs and 1POs informed. Through proper
assessment and advocacy for application of appropriate resources through the IPOs,
we will continue to assure that NASA personnel and resources are afforded the high-
est degree of fire protection.
ATTACHMENT1
Specific responses to Section Ill: Information in Support of Findings and
Recommendations, e23, ASAP Annual Report, February 1997:
1. Auditory or visual locator for PCS units in an alarm condition.
RESPONSE: A PCS loeator function is an interesting concept; however, the bene-
fits of a beeping laptop need to be weighed against the ambiguity caused by several
beeping laptops located in multiple locations throughout the vehicle. This capa-
bility as well as options pertaining to visual location will be studied for fimire
upgrades.
2. Strategies to implement remedial actions from the PCS keyboard.
RESPONSE: The PCS is the primary crew interface device for ISS vehicle systems
and payloads. This includes all required data and commands to operate the vehi-
cle during nominal, assembly, and contingency situations. In this role, the PCS
provides detailed C&W event information, confirming cues in the form of asso-
ciated data, and complete response capabilities through commands initiation.
The crew can also initiate emergency alarms manually from the PCS as well as
automated responses to these events per Engineering Change Proposal {ECP)
555.
3. A localization scheme for &pressurization events.
RESPONSE: Mission Operations personnel working in conjunction with the Flight
Crew Office, Safety, Boeing prime contractor, and the CWSIT have developed
isolation procedures for rapid depressurization events as well as many other con-
tingency scenarios. These procedures and flight rules undergo much review and
scrutiny during the stage specific Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) and
Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR) processes. The procedure pertaining to rapid
depressurization involves (a) proposed (ECP 555) automated software actions to
isolate ventilation valves, overboard vents, and cabin air circulation, (b) manual
crew hatch closures, and (c) the use of the PCS and module pressure sensors to
isolate the leak to a specific module.
4. Interfaces with the ECLSS; division of responsibilities must be further defined.
RESPONSE: Since its introduction, the CWSIT has worked closely with the
ECLSS architecture team to ensure common goals are met with respect to an inte-
grated C&W system. The ECLSS has functional responsibility for the
specifications pertaining to rapid &pressurization, fire, and toxic spill, while the
CWSIT has the responsibility of ensuring a safe, robust, and operationally inte-
grated C&W system. ECLSS is one of many teams interfaced with by the CWSIT;
others include all system architecture teams, safety, human factors, software
design, operations, and the flight crew.
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5. The control of payload toxic hazards, detection of fire, and power failure must
be resolved.
RESPONSE: ISS payloads have stringent hazard control requirements, including
automated sating, triple containment of hazardous substances, etc. Payload C&W
events also undergo the same event classification process as ISS systems and will
enunciate appropriate C&W events as required.
Fire detection for the ISS is performed by an integrated system of rack and open
volume sensors. These sensors are located throughout the vehicle and with all
international modules. Response to a fire scenario is well documented and
receives station, safety, flight crew, and mission operations program approval prior
to flight.
Loss of electrical power is detected by the power system and enunciated by the
C&W system. Several automated Failure Detection, Isolation, and Recovery
(FDIR) routines are contained with the vehicle software to respond to all but the
most benign losses of power. Loss of main bus power, which causes a cascade
effect, is controlled by proper C&W event classification and integration of C&W
and FDIR algorithms.
6. The team needs to be given sufficient priority so that their systems engineering
activities can have a timely in_uence.
RESPONSE: The CWSIT has been given full authority to review, guide, and rec-
ommend system changes for the C&W system. This includes official recognition
of the organization within the Avionics Integration Office and charter as directed
by the Deputy Program Manager for Operations. The CWSIT will continue to
provide design integration expertise in a most prudent fashion, and without regard
to organizational boundaries.
ATTACHMENT2
Response #25: Specification to accommodate a "hands-free" communications capa-
bility on the International Space Station:
1. The Station Wireless Communications Subsystem (SWCS) shah provide wireless
duplex voice communication over any one of the audio loops in the ISS Audio
Distribution Subsystem.
2. The crew shall have the capability to receive, but not to originate, page messages
over the SWCS (the crew would go to an Audio Terminal Unit, which has pro-
visions to prevent acoustic feedback, to originate a page--no headset required).
3. The SWCS shall provide communications coverage throughout all inhabitable
modules with hatches open or closed.
4. The SWCS shall have provisions to add the following capabilities at a later date:
(a) two-way video synchronized with the audio channels to support video con-
ferencing
(b) data rite transfers
5. The SWCS will be installed on orbit no earlier than assembly flight 6A.
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JANUARY-DECEMBER1997
JANUARY
6 Kennedy Space Center, STS-81 Flight Readiness Review
7-8 Kennedy Space Center, Review of KSC Operations and Space Flight
Operations Contract
16 Johnson Space Center, Review of Space Operations with Thiokol Officials
30 Kennedy Space Center, STS-82 Flight Readiness Review
FEBRUARY
6-7 Headquarters, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Meeting; Caution
and Warning System, Aeronautics, Chief Information Office, and Ethics
Briefings
10-11 Kennedy Space Center, STS-82 Launch and Discussions with Center
Director
18 Johnson Space Center, International Space Station Caution and Warning
System Briefing
24 Headquarters, Space Shuttle Related Topics with Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
MARCH
5 Headquarters, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Planning Discussion with
Staff
10-12 Kennedy Space Center, KSC Operations and Space Flight Operations
Contract Update
13 Headquarters, Testimony Before the House Subcommittee for Space and
Aeronautics
20 Kennedy Space Center, STS-83 Flight Readiness Review and Super Light
Weight Tank Discussions with MSFC Center Director
26 Seattle, WA, The Boeing Company, International Space Station
Discussions
27 Ames Research Center, Computer Hardware/Software Team Visit
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APRIL
3
17
3O
Lockheed, International Space Station 3rd Tier Discussions
Crystal City, VA, Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) Discussions
with United Space Alliance Advisory Board
Kennedy Space Center, STS-84 Flight Readiness Review
MAY
6-8
12-13
22
28
Kennedy Space Center, KSC Operations and Plenary Session
Ames Research Center, Aeronautics Team Visit
Kennedy Space Center, NASA/FAA Human Factors Workshop
Headquarters, Meeting with Deputy Associate Administrator for Space
Flight
JUNE
17-19
19
Marshall Space Flight Center, Review of Space Shuttle Projects/Reusable
Launch Vehicle/Space Station Programs
Kennedy Space Center, STS-94 Flight Readiness Review
JuLY
8-9
17
17
24
Langley Research Center, Aeronautics Team Visit
Sundstrand, Auxiliary Power Unit Sub-Task Team Visit
Hamilton Standard, International Space Station 3rd Tier Visit
Kennedy Space Center, STS-85 Flight Readiness Review
AUGUST
12-14
18
Johnson Space Center, Review of Space Shuttle, International Space
Station, and Other Programs and Plenary Session
Headquarters, Space Shuttle Safety Study Status Review with Deputy
Associate Administrator for Space Flight
SEPTEMBER
12
15-16
17
18
23-25
25
29
30
Headquarters,ReviewNASAResponsetoAnnualReport
Headquarters,HumanExplorationandDevelopmentof SpaceAssurance
BoardVideoTeleconference
KennedySpaceCenter,STS-86FlightReadinessReview
DrydenFlightResearchCenter,AeronauticsTeamVisit
Boeing-Rocketdyne,SpaceShuttleTeamVisit
Boeing,SpaceSystems,SpaceShuttleTeamVisit
MarshallSpaceFlightCenter,SpaceProgramConference
KennedySpaceCenter,STS-86Launch
Fairmont,WV,to DiscussIndependent Verification and Validation
Michoud, Visit to Discuss Super Light Weight Tank Design Certification
Review
OCTOBER
1 Headquarters, Testimony Before the House Subcommittee for Space and
Aeronautics
6 Kennedy Space Center, KSC/Space Flight Operations Contract Team Visit
16-17 Thiokol, Reusable Solid Rocket Motor Review
NOVEMBER
3 Kennedy Space Center, STS-87 Flight Readiness Review
4 Headquarters, Meeting with Congressman Sensenbrenner
18-19 Headquarters, Plenary Session and Preparations of Annual Report
DECEMBER
1-3
17-18
18-19
Headquarters, Editorial Committee Meeting
Johnson Space Center, JSC Task Team Visit
Headquarters, Editorial Committee Meeting
ANNUAL REPORT
FOa 1997
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